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Being publicly shamed is, for some, a fate worse than death. This
article addresses a tension at the heart of the practice of “popular
public shaming” as a social regulatory mechanism. While shaming
can be an effective and inexpensive tool to reflect and impart current
collective values, it also can deter victims of wrongs from vindicating
their rights in court, thereby inhibiting the pursuit of justice. Some
legislatures and courts, including the United States Supreme Court,
have sought to address this problem by permitting certain
rightsholders to bring lawsuits pseudonymously. However, as this
article shows, the standards and procedures in place for doing so are
ad hoc, inefficient, and, ultimately, ineffective. Furthermore, current
legislative opposition to plaintiffs’ use of pseudonyms, on the grounds
that plaintiff anonymity undermines longstanding ideals of judicial
openness, is misguided. As this article demonstrates, the normative
and historical foundations of the concern for judicial openness in fact
favor a limited option for plaintiffs to bring lawsuits without
revealing their identities. When rightsholders demonstrate a
likelihood of “public shaming” that reasonably will deter them from
bringing a lawsuit, I propose that they should be presumptively
permitted to proceed under a pseudonym. The burden then should
shift to the defendant—and to the public—to show why the
pseudonym should not be allowed. This article shows how adopting
such a rule would address the risk that public shaming poses to
access to justice, while simultaneously protecting the legitimate
interests of defendants’ and society’s interest in monitoring the
judicial process.
INTRODUCTION
Imagine you are a guest in someone’s home. An accident occurs
in which you fall and suffer a serious injury. As a result, you are
required to have multiple expensive surgeries. As is common in
cases such as this, you seek compensation from your host’s
homeowner’s insurance policy. Doing so requires you to sue your
host and name as a defendant—for pro forma purposes only—the
specific individual who caused your fall. You file the routine suit in
the local court in the Connecticut town where the incident took
place. The catch? The named defendant in your lawsuit is your
twelve-year-old nephew. In his exuberance to greet you at his eighth
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birthday party, he jumped forcefully into your arms and caused you
to fall and shatter your wrist. The media, which regularly scans
court filings in search of “juicy” cases, finds out about your lawsuit
and publicizes it. The story quickly goes viral, and you are vilified
around the globe. Even journalists themselves weigh in, with one
television reporter stating on the air that you should “use your good
hand to wave goodbye to that family relationship.”2
The above is the true story of Jennifer Connell, whose lawsuit3
against her nephew made international headlines.4 It is an example
of extrajudicial, or popular, public shaming5 directed at a plaintiff in
a lawsuit. Connell was pilloried in the media and online. Trending
hashtags on Twitter dubbed her the “worst aunt ever,” “the
#auntfromhell,” and the most hated woman in America.6 The New

2. Ree Hines, ‘Worst aunt ever’ speaks out: ‘I was never comfortable’ suing
nephew, TODAY.COM (Oct. 15, 2015), http://www.today.com/parents/worst-aunt-everspeaks-out-i-was-never-comfortable-suing-t50351.
3. See generally Connell v. Minor Defendant, No. CV-13-6033608-S (Conn.
Super. Ct. Oct. 15, 2015).
4. See Matthew Murphy, Brekkie Wrap: Nephew of ‘world’s worst aunt’ who
unsuccessfully sued him speaks out, NEWS.COM.AU (Oct. 16, 2015), http://www.news.
com.au/world/brekkie-wrap-nephew-of-worlds-worst-aunt-who-unsuccessfully-suedhim-speaks-out/news-story/e11a8e1677ba865e240e109a42b2a223; Nephew of ‘world’s
worst aunt’ defends her: ‘She loves us’, NEW ZEALAND HERALD (Oct. 16, 2015), http://
www.nzherald.co.nz/lifestyle/news/article.cfm?c_id=6&objectid=11530090; Schoolboy
Sued by His Aunt for Breaking Her Wrist ‘Still Loves Her”, THEJOURNAL.IE (Oct. 15,
2015), http://www.thejournal.ie/boy-sued-by-aunt-2391096-Oct2015; Darren Boyle,
Nephew of ‘worst aunt ever’ who sued him for hugging her too hard and breaking her
wrist speaks for the first time: ‘She would never do anything to hurt me’, DAILY MAIL
(Oct. 14, 2015), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3272025/Jury-rejects-NewYork-aunt-s-127-000-bid-sue-nephew-breaking-wrist-welcoming-EIGHTHbirthday.html; Darren Boyle, 'I love you...but you owe me $127,000': New York aunt
sues nephew, 12, who broke her wrist at his eighth birthday party - because she can no
longer hold a plate of hor d'oeuvres, DAILY MAIL (Oct. 13, 2015),
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3270400/I-love-owe-127-000-New-York-auntsues-nephew-12-broke-wrist-greeting-eighth-birthday-party.html.
5. When I use the terms “public shaming” or “popular public shaming” or any
of their grammatical variations, I refer to disparagement, by ordinary members of
society, the purpose of which is to embarrass, annoy, humiliate, threaten, intimidate,
silence, or bring about any sort of degradation or diminution of an individual, group
of individuals, or entity.
6. See, e.g., Jenna Greene, Aunt Who Sued Nephew Not Actually the Worst
Person in the World, THE AMERICAN LAWYER (Oct. 14, 2015); Nicky Woolf, Insurance
system may be to blame for aunt’s lawsuit against 12-year-old, THE GUARDIAN (Oct.
14, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/oct/14/aunt-nephew-brokenwrist-lawsuit-homeowners-insurance.
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York Daily News labeled her “the Auntie Christ,”7 and the online
comments around the world about the story were quick and mostly
harsh.8 They included:








“AUNT JEN—Just replace the A with a C.”9
“I bet she is a burden on the company she works for, her
coworkers hate her, and she’s had several failed
marriages.”10
“I want her face on my toilet paper. We all know why.”11
“Maybe she’s a Manhattan escort and can’t give hand
jibbers anymore.”12
“There is a special place in hell for her. I hope she rots.”13
“This woman is scum. Pure human garbage.”14
“She deserves to be publicly shamed.”15

As a result of the public uproar, Connell appeared with her
nephew on the Today show in an attempt to clear her name.16 She
emphasized that naming her nephew as a defendant was a mere

7. Chelsia R. Marcus & Corky Siemaszko, NYC aunt loses lawsuit against 12year old nephew over birthday hug that broke her wrist, N.Y. DAILY
NEWS (Oct. 13, 2015), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/boy-12-trial-conn
breaking-aunt-wrist-article-1. 2395756.
8. Some posters espoused the idea that the lawsuit was indeed a legal
technicality. Stated one, “[m]ore likely . . . that there is a homeowners' insurance
policy that has liability coverage that would apply to the aunt's medical bills, and the
only way to collect against that insurance policy is to file a legal claim against the
party who caused the injury.” Another said, “[t]his is probably more to do with
insurance companies . . . than it has to do anyone suing a child.” Woman sues 8 year
old nephew for injuring her wrist during his birthday party, REDDIT, http://www.redd
it.com/r/news/comments/3ol3vl/woman_sues_8_year_old_nephew_for_injuring_her/#b
ottom-comments (last visited Sept. 6, 2017) (comment by TheDigitalRuler).
9. Reddit, Woman sues 8 year old nephew for injuring her wrist during his
birthday party, REDDIT, http://www.reddit.com/r/news/comments/3ol3vl/woman_sues
_8_year_old_nephew_for_injuring_her/#bottom-comments (last visited Sept. 6, 2017).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Darren Boyle, 'I love you...but you owe me $127,000': New York aunt sues
nephew, 12, who broke her wrist at his eighth birthday party - because she can no
longer hold a plate of hor d'oeuvres, DAILY MAIL (Oct. 13, 2015), http://www.
dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3270400/I-love-owe-127-000-New-York-aunt-suesnephew-12-broke-wrist-greeting-eighth-birthday-party.html#comments.
14. REDDIT, supra note 8 (comment by Cheerful_Pessimist).
15. Id.
16. Ree Hines, ‘Worst aunt ever’ speaks out: ‘I was never comfortable’ suing
nephew, TODAY.COM (Oct. 15, 2015), http://www.today.com/parents/worst-aunt-everspeaks-out-i-was-never-comfortable-suing-t50351.
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legal formality.17 Her nephew insisted that “[Connell] would never
do anything to hurt the family . . . She loves us.”18
As recently observed in the New York Times:
[l]awsuits involving well-known figures and sensitive issues
have always drawn publicity, of course. But now that more
courts are using electronic filing systems, judges and lawyers
say they worry that the public is consuming lawsuits without
any context. The most serious consequences: that some
victims, fearing that the potential adverse aspects of online
attention will outweigh the benefits, will decide not to file
complaints at all. . . . In interviews, several plaintiffs’
lawyers said the current online environment was already
deterring potential clients from filing suit.19
The United States Supreme Court itself has acknowledged the
threat to our legal system resulting from rightsholders wary of
bringing their cases in light of the public ramifications of doing so.20
In affirming a holding of the Washington Supreme Court, the United
States Supreme Court stated:
The Supreme Court of Washington properly emphasized the
importance of ensuring that potential litigants have
unimpeded access to the courts: “[A]s the trial court rightly
observed, rather than expose themselves to unwanted
publicity, individuals may well forgo the pursuit of their just
claims. The judicial system will thus have made the
utilization of its remedies so onerous that the people will be
reluctant or unwilling to use it, resulting in frustration of a
right as valuable as that of speech itself.”21

17. Id.
18. See Lisa Green, Nothing personal: Why Jennifer Connell sued her nephew —
and why it was a lost cause, TODAY.COM (Oct. 16, 2015), http://www.today.com/
parents/nothing-personal-why-jennifer-connell-sued-her-nephew-why-it-t50686.
19. Jodi Kantor, Lawsuits’ Lurid Details Draw an Online Crowd, N.Y. TIMES,
(Feb. 23, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/23/us/lawsuits-lurid-details-drawan-online-crowd.html?_r=1. Maryland law professor Leigh Goodmark noted that the
online boom of gender-related court documents was a harbinger of a future in which
virtually no legal document—an eviction notice, a divorce pleading with
embarrassing details—would be safe from public consumption. “Things people never
bargained on getting out will get out,” she said. Id.
20. Seattle Times v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 36 (1984).
21. Id. (quoting Rhinehart v. Seattle Times, 654 P.2d 673, 689 (Wash. 1982)).
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Several lower courts have recognized the deterrent effect that
failure to permit rightsholders to proceed pseudonymously can have
on meritorious claims.22 Scholars have weighed in on the issue as
well. Lior Strahilevitz has opined that “the nonavailability of
pseudonymity may discourage some parties from bringing suits in
the first place.”23 Daniel Solove stated simply, “[m]ore people should
be allowed to sue without having their real names appear in the
record.”24
The justifications for the denial of plaintiff pseudonymity—most
commonly a concern with judicial openness—do not recognize that
the threat that modern technology presents to our judicial system is
beyond the capacity of privacy law to remedy.25 Moreover, requests
by rightsholders to proceed anonymously are greeted with
antiquated court procedures that are ill-suited to responding to the
impact of the internet and social media. Indeed, the internet has
been growing exponentially—both in terms of technology and

22. See Doe v. Oshrin, 299 F.R.D. 100, 104 (D.N.J. 2014) (“the Court finds that
denying Plaintiff’s motion [to proceed pseudonymously] may inhibit Plaintiff’s
willingness to pursue her claims”); D.M. v. Cty. of Berks, 929 F. Supp. 2d 390, 402
(E.D. Pa. 2013) (“disallowing anonymity would likely deter those [in these types of
cases] . . . from vindicating their rights”); Doe v. Hartford Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 237
F.R.D. 545, 550 (D.N.J. 2006) (“if this Court denies Plaintiff's motion, there exists
the possibility that he might not pursue his claim due to the stigmatization that may
result in his community and to his professional career”); Doe v. Provident Life & Acc.
Ins. Co., 176 F.R.D. 464, 467 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (“the public may have a strong interest
in protecting the privacy of plaintiffs in controversial cases so that these plaintiffs
are not discouraged from asserting their claims”); Doe v. Szul Jewelry, Inc., No.
0604277, 2008 WL 2157893 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. May 13, 2008) (“[t]he only purpose
revelation of plaintiff's name could have would be to further discomfit plaintiff and
perhaps deter her from litigating the matter.”); Roe v. Providence Health Sys.-Or.,
No. 06-1680-HU, 2007 WL 1876520, at *4 (D. Or. June 26, 2007) (“the public has an
interest in seeing this case decided on the merits. Jane Roe's allegations center on
disability discrimination, an issue which carries important implications for disabled
persons and for society as a whole. Should Jane Roe or her husband be mandated to
provide their true identities, they may be deterred from continuing the lawsuit.
Therefore, the public's interest in an open trial will not be impaired, and may
actually be better served if plaintiffs' identities remain sealed.”).
23. Lior J. Strahilevitz, Pseudonymous Litigation, CHIC. L. & ECON. SERIES
1247 (2010) (“[r]equiring Doe to forego her lawsuit [because she could not do]
pseudonymously would have deprived her of meaningful relief and cost us a helpful
clarification of precedent and statutory text”).
24. DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: GOSSIP, RUMOR, AND
PRIVACY ON THE INTERNET 121 (2007),
http://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=2081&context=faculty_publications.
25. See, e.g,. Jayne S. Ressler, Privacy, Plaintiffs and Pseudonyms: The
Anonymous Doe Plaintiff in the Information Age, 53 KAN. L. REV. 195, 197 (2004).
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substance.26 Speeds have increased dramatically, and “smart
phones” make the internet available during every moment of our
lives.27 Access to court documents is often as simple as a click or a
few keystrokes.28 Noted one journalist, “[l]awsuit papers are
generally public, but before the advent of electronic filing, most of
them remained stuffed inside folders and filing cabinets at
courthouses.”29 In addition, social media has become a mainstay of
everyday life. Studies show that over 60% of Americans obtain their
news from social media,30 over two-thirds of which comes from
Facebook.31 Perhaps the most concerning of all developments,
however, is the use of the internet, by vast numbers of mostly
anonymous “ordinary” people, to publicly shame those (almost
always strangers) with whom the “shamer” disagrees.32 When this
popular shaming is connected to plaintiffs in a lawsuit, its effects
can be far-reaching and profound. The New York Times observed
that:
[i]ntimate, often painful allegations in lawsuits—intended for
the scrutiny of judges and juries—are increasingly drawing
in mass online audiences far from the courthouses where
they are filed. . . .[E]lectronic case databases, blogs and

26. It is estimated that in 2004 there were 51,611,646 websites and
910,060,180 users; in 2013, there were 672,985,183 websites and 2,756,198,420
users. Total Number of Websites, INTERNET LIVE STATS, http://www.internetlivestats.
com/total-number-of-websites/#trend (last visited Oct. 10, 2016).
27. For example, in 2002, it took twelve and a half minutes to download a song
on a 56K modem; by 2012, a song could be downloaded in eighteen seconds. See Pam
Dyer, How the Internet has Changed in the Last 10 Years, PAMORAMA,
http://pamorama.net/2012/10/06/how-the-internet-has-changed-in-the-last-10-yearsinfographic/ (last visted Oct. 1, 2016); see also John Aziz, Why is American Internet so
Slow?, THE WEEK (March 5, 2014), http://theweek.com/articles/449919/whyamerican-internet-slow.
28. Kantor, supra note 19.
29. Id.
30. See Jordan Crook, 62 Percent of U.S. adults get their news from social
media, says report, TECHCRUNCH, (May 26, 2016), http://techcrunch.com
/2016/05/26/most-people-get-their-news-from-social-media-says-report.
31. See Paul Fletcher, Two-Thirds Of Adults Get News From Social Media,
FORBES (May 28, 2016), http://www.forbes.com/sites/paulfletcher/2016/05/28/twothirds-of-adults-get-news-from-social-media/#159c2c2f2211; Joseph Lichterman,
Nearly half of U.S. adults get news on Facebook, Pew says, NIEMAN LAB (May 26,
2016),
http://www.niemanlab.org/2016/05/pew-report-44-percent-of-u-s-adults-getnews-on-facebook.
32. See JON RONSON, SO YOU’VE BEEN PUBLICLY SHAMED (2015).
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social media propel a case into the spotlight even when the
parties are not public figures.33
Danielle Citron noted that a Google search can forever portray
even a successful litigant as “the complainer, or the slut who
allegedly slept with the boss.”34 The power of public shaming—
including the fear of being publicly shamed—should not be
underestimated.35 Even Shakespeare penned in Othello “I have lost
my reputation! I have lost the immortal part of myself and what
remains is bestial.”36
The time is ripe for legislatures and the judiciary to refocus their
attitudes and practices toward pseudonymous plaintiffs. I propose
that lawmakers directly acknowledge the impact that the threat of
public shaming can have on rightsholders—a threat that affects not
just individuals, but the entire legal system. It is essential in doing
so that lawmakers and scholars alike recognize that permitting
pseudonymous plaintiffs does not undermine, but rather supports,
the values behind the ideals of judicial openness—whatever its
meaning.37
This article is the first to discuss popular public shaming in the
context of its impact on a prospective or actual plaintiff. Much of
today’s public shaming occurs online, so the focus of this paper,
although not exclusively, is on online shaming. While several

33. Jodi Kantor, Lawsuits’ Lurid Details Draw an Online Crowd, N.Y. TIMES,
(Feb. 23, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/23/us/lawsuits-lurid-details-drawan-online-crowd.html?_r=1.
34. Id.
35. The fear of being publically shamed is alive and well in the law professor
community. In an email exchange that occurred on the CivPro list-serv, <CIVPRO@LISTSERV.ND.EDU, a professor wrote that she was “doing some consulting
work on a piece of litigation that raises some very interesting procedural issues, and
I am sharing them here to see what insights you might offer.” She then provided
somewhat extensive details about the case upon which she had been asked to opine.
One member of the list-serve responded “this is an issue that may not have come up
before, but I view the purpose of this list to be facilitating each other's scholarly
work. . . . I think this kind of request may be a bit ultra vires,” while another stated
“I am vaguely uncomfortable with using the list as a research tool for paid outside
consulting work.” These comments prompted the poster who had initially posed the
query to respond “for the decade-plus that I have been a member of this listserv, I
have repeatedly and continually shied away from sending any group-wide messages,
precisely because I feared saying something inadvertently that would expose me to
public ridicule. Alas, the moment has arrived[.]” Postings of [names withheld] to
CIV-PRO@LISTSERV.ND.EDU (May 18 and 19, 2016) (on file with author).
36. RONSON, supra note 32, at 143–44 (quoting WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE,
OTHELLO act 2, sc. 3).
37. See discussion infra Part III B.
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scholars have written about the damage that various forms of online
shaming or “cyber harassment”38 can impose on individuals and
society,39 my focus is on the intersection between the threat of being
publicly shamed and potential litigation. Specifically, I suggest that
when public shaming deters certain rightsholders from bringing
litigation, or negatively affects those that already have initiated a
lawsuit, there is a chilling effect that should be protected against. In
other words, if the law provides for recovery for a plaintiff’s claim,
the potential for being publicly shamed should have no part in
deterring a rightsholder from bringing a lawsuit. This is particularly
true with respect to individual rightsholders, as scholars have
deemed individual plaintiffs “of vital importance to our legal
system.”40
I therefore propose that when a lawsuit is likely to be met with
public shaming that reasonably would deter a rightsholder from
proceeding, that the rightsholder be permitted to litigate
pseudonymously. Unlike scholarship which proposes various means
to punish cyber harassment when it occurs,41 my proposal is a
prophylactic designed to prevent the deterrent effect public shaming
can have on potential plaintiffs. Under the right circumstances,
plaintiff pseudonymity could neutralize the dangers of public
shaming, while maintaining society’s ability to access the judicial
process, enable individual rightsholders to obtain justice, and
maintain the law’s effectiveness in promoting desired social policy.
In Part I of this article, I briefly examine the practice of public
shaming. First, I consider the function of public shaming as a
societal behavioral regulatory mechanism. Next, I assess how public
shaming has affected plaintiffs—both actual and potential—as
reported in the popular press. I then analyze the judicial response,
via case law, to the role that public shaming has played in the
context of rightsholders seeking to proceed pseudonymously. I

38. Danielle Citron has defined cyber harassment to be “threats of violence,
privacy invasions, reputation-harming lies, calls for strangers to physically harm
victims, and technological attacks.” DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN
CYBERSPACE 3 (2014).
39. See, e.g., id.
40. Alex Stein & Gideon Parchomovsky, Empowering Individual Plaintiffs, 102
CORNELL L. REV. 1319, 1325 (2017) (stating that “[l]awsuits by individual victims are
unique in that they constitute the only litigation form that simultaneously advances
the twin goal of deterring wrongdoers and compensating victims.”).
41. See, e.g., Derek Bambauer, Exposed, 98 MINN. L. REV. 2025 (2014)
(regarding copyright violation); Danielle K. Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L.
REV. 61 (2009) (regarding civil rights violation); Mary A. Franks, Sexual Harassment
2.0, 71 MD. L. REV. 655 (2012) (regarding sexual harassment).
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conclude Part I by reviewing the powerful role that technology and
social media currently plays in today’s popular-shaming-rich culture.
In Part II, I present the current state of the law regarding
plaintiff pseudonymity. I examine federal and state legislation and
case law in this area. I highlight the varied, often ad hoc, methods
courts currently use in evaluating rightsholders’ requests to litigate
anonymously. I expose the substantive and procedural
inconsistencies, often within the same jurisdiction, when plaintiff
anonymity is at issue.
Part III discusses the strongest impediment to the practice of
plaintiff pseudonymity—the ideology of judicial openness. I explain
that most lawmakers assume that judicial openness refers to the
notion that the judicial process not be carried out in secret,
concluding therefore that plaintiff pseudonymity should not be
permitted; however, the origin of the ideal of judicial openness is
unclear. Thus, I explore scholarly disagreement about its meaning. I
suggest that regardless of the historical definition of judicial
openness, it is not necessarily lost when plaintiffs proceed using a
pseudonym. I argue that paradoxically, our judicial system’s
functionality is best preserved when certain rightsholders are
permitted to bring their actions anonymously.
In Part IV, I conclude with a recommendation that legislatures
and courts incorporate concern for the potential deterrent threat of
public shaming into their jurisprudence regarding pseudonymous
plaintiffs. Specifically, I suggest that if a rightsholder can show that
public shaming will be a likely result of bringing a lawsuit, and that
threat reasonably will deter the rightsholder from proceeding,
plaintiff pseudonymity be presumptively permitted. My proposal
shifts the burden to an objecting party—and to the public—to show
why the plaintiff should not be permitted to proceed
pseudonymously. To support my proposal, I provide guidelines for
the contents of a protective order that I suggest courts use in
furtherance of the pseudonymous plaintiff process.
My proposal encourages federal and state legislatures and courts
to recognize the potential for popular public shaming inherent with
modern technology and the extraordinary damage that shaming can
inflict—both on rightsholders and the judicial system as a whole.
With respect to cases where rightsholders are at risk of being
deterred from bringing their claims out of fear of being publicly
shamed, a change in the approach to, and procedure involved in,
deciding whether they may proceed anonymously is imperative.
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I. PUBLIC SHAMING
A. Public Shaming as an Indicator and Regulator of Normative
Values
Scholars have long debated the benefits and drawbacks of public
shaming as both a behavioral regulatory mechanism and a means of
punishment for criminal behavior.42 Dan Kahan has stated that “it
should be politically acceptable to punish a wide array of offenses
with shaming alone.”43 Many opine that shaming can be low-cost,
flexible, and sometimes more effective at regulating behavior than
more traditional methods.44 Shaming also can level the playing field
between Davids and Goliaths and give the shamer a sense of
satisfaction that traditional regulatory means do not impart.45
Shaming also provides an insight into collective normative values.
Perhaps one of the most successful examples of public shaming
as a barometer and enforcer of social norms occurred with the 2013
broadcast of CNN’s documentary Blackfish.46 The film told the story
of Tilikum, a 12,000 pound orca whale kept in captivity by SeaWorld
and used in its popular shows.47 The documentary highlighted the
dangers that trainers face while working with orcas, and revealed
Tilikum’s role in the deaths of three handlers.48 CNN exposed the
heartless methods used to capture orca whales from the wild and
made the case that keeping these whales in captivity for
entertainment purposes is cruel and inhumane.49 After the
documentary aired, Consumerist branded SeaWorld as one of the

42. See, e.g., Leah Griswald, Shaming Trademark Bullies, 2011 WIS. L. REV.
625 (2011); Dan Kahan, What’s Really Wrong with Shaming Sanctions, 84 TEX. L.
REV. 2075 (2006); Elizabeth Rosenblatt, Fear and Loathing: Shame, Shaming, and
Intellectual Property, 63 DEPAUL L. REV. 1 (2013); David Skeel Jr., Shaming in
Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1811 (2001). The details of these complex and
nuanced debates are beyond the scope of this article.
43. Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV.
591, 637 (1996). But see Dan M. Kahan, What’s Really Wrong with Shaming
Sanctions, 84 TEX. L. REV. 2075, 2075 (2006) (stating that the author has “concluded
that [he] was wrong” to defend shaming as an alternative sanction).
44. See Rosenblatt, supra note 42, at 31–32.
45. Id. at 32–33.
46. BLACKFISH (CNN Films 2013).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.

790

TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84.779

“Four Worst Companies in America.”50 Attendance dropped at
SeaWorld theme parks, and various celebrities and corporations
severed ties with the company.51 Its stock price plummeted,52 the
chief executive resigned,53 and SeaWorld announced that it will
officially end its orca breeding program—a decision labeled “a huge
concession to critics and animal welfare groups.”54
On the other hand, scholar Toni Massaro has concluded,
“[w]e . . . cannot ignore the profound harm that effective shaming,
where it can be achieved, may cause.”55 Indeed, some critics of
shaming punishments argue that they are inhumane and
degrading.56 Others call them “lynch justice,”57 which violate the
offender’s “transactional dignity.”58
To be sure, attention has been paid to those found guilty,
shamed, and later exonerated, who then remain unable to escape the
ignominy. My focus goes one step further, as my concern is with
those who have done nothing wrong, but rather are innocent

50. See Worst Company in America, WORDPRESS, http://consumermediallc.files.
wordpress.com/2014/04/2014wciabracketqfinal.png (last visited Sept. 6, 2017).
51. See Jordan Zakarin, The Documentary “Blackfish” is Causing More Major
Problems for SeaWorld, BUZZFEED (Jan. 3, 2014), http://www.buzzfeed.com/
jordanzakarin/the-documentary-blackfish-problems-for-seaworld?utm_term=.
nrR1wWWYJ#.jbJMX00LP. See also Greg Allen, January 15, 2014, Months After
'Blackfish' Release, Controversy Over SeaWorld Grows, NPR (Jan. 15, 2014),
http://www.npr.org/2014/01/15/262767226/months-after-blackfish-releasecontroversy-for-seaworld-grows; Melissa Cronin, SeaWorld Loses 1 Million Visitors
As It Clings To Orca Captivity, THE DODO (Feb. 26, 2015), https://www.thedodo.
com/seaworld-stock-quarter-four-1012275533.html; Hannah Samson, SeaWorld Is
Still Tanking as Public Perception Problems Return, SKIFT (Aug. 8, 2017),
https://skift.com/2017/08/08/seaworld-is-still-tanking-as-public-perception-problemsreturn/.
52. Roberto Ferdman, Chart: What the documentary ‘Blackfish’ has done to
SeaWorld, WASH. POST (Dec. 12, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
wonk/wp/2014/12/12/chart-what-the-documentary-blackfish-has-done-toseaworld/?utm_term=.9616e661cbef.
53. Id.
54. See Greg Allen, SeaWorld Agrees To End Captive Breeding Of Killer
Whales, NPR (Mar. 17, 2016), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/03/17/
470720804/seaworld-agrees-to-end-captive-breeding-of-killer-whales.
55. Toni Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L.
REV. 1880, 1943 (1991).
56. Lauren M. Goldman, Trending Now: The Use of Social Media Websites on
Public Shaming Punishments, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 415, 432 (2014).
57. Id. at 436 (quoting James Whitman, What is Wrong with Inflicting Shame
Sanctions? 107 YALE L.J. 1055, 1059 (1998)).
58. James Whitman, What is Wrong with Inflicting Shame Sanctions? 107
YALE L.J. 1055, 1090 (1998).
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rightsholders whose vulnerability to shaming impacts their ability to
seek justice.
Because collective ideals are included in the substantive law as a
result of the legislative process, rightsholders should be free to
pursue their rights under those ideals. Shaming should have no role
in influencing whether certain rightsholders will pursue their
actions. To be clear, shaming can still play an important function in
demonstrating societal reaction to specific litigation. However, its
part should be in the form of a response to an anonymous plaintiff’s
lawsuit instead of as potential deterrent to a named plaintiff. That
way the public would be free to express its views on lawsuits,
thereby imparting normative societal values and potentially
inspiring change, while simultaneously permitting rightsholders to
vindicate their rights.
B. Public Shaming’s Deterrent Effect on Potential Plaintiffs
In Privacy, Plaintiffs and Pseudonyms: The Anonymous Doe
Plaintiff in the Information Age,59 I suggested that reluctance to
permit certain rightsholders to proceed pseudonymously would stifle
the judicial process and force some rightsholders to choose to forgo
their claims in the name of protecting their privacy.60 Recent events
bear out my hypothesis. For example, in 2015, hackers known as
“The Impact Team” broke into Ashley Madison, a website with over
30 million users who are married—or otherwise in a committed
relationship—seeking to have an affair.61 The hackers posted
personal information online about many Ashley Madison users, who,
as a result of the disclosure of their private information, then sued
Avid Life Media, Ashley Madison’s parent company.62 Many of the
purported plaintiffs sought to proceed as “John Doe,” concerned
about the privacy violations that would ensue if their names were
available to the public.63 Although psychologists opined that
59. Ressler, supra note 25.
60. Id.
61. See Rory Bahadur, Individual Sovereignty, Freer Sex, and Diminished
Privacy: How an Informed and Realistic Modern Sexual Morality Provides Salvation
from Unjustified Shame, 8 ELON L. REV. 245, 274 (2016).
62. In re Ashley Madison Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 148 F. Supp. 3d
1378 (J.P.M.L. 2015).
63. In re Ashley Madison Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., No. 2669, 2016 WL
1366616, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 6, 2016) (“Forty-two Plaintiffs seeking to represent a
class of users of the Ashley Madison website have filed under pseudonym ‘to reduce
the risk of potentially catastrophic personal and professional consequences that
could befall them and their families’ should they be publicly identified as someone
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“[d]ealing with an affair in a very public way makes the
embarrassment greater and the hurt for the spouse and kids even
more devastating,”64 the judge nonetheless denied the plaintiffs the
ability to proceed under a pseudonym.65 As a result, several
plaintiffs declined to proceed with the action.66 It was reported that
at least one victim of the hacking and resulting publication of
personal information committed suicide.67
In 2014, harsh backlash on social media forced former Miami
Dolphins’ quarterback Dan Marino to withdraw his participation as
a plaintiff in a suit regarding concussions against the NFL.68 There
was speculation regarding whether Marino would be employable by
the Dolphins if he continued his involvement in the lawsuit.69
Commentators were quick to point out that, unlike Marino, “Troy
Aikman, Steve Young and Boomer Esiason have declined to join the
thousands of plaintiffs in any concussion suit against the NFL while
they have continued to work with various NFL broadcast
partners.”70 Accordingly, Marino issued a statement, noting:
I authorized a claim to be filed on my behalf . . . . In so doing
I did not realize I would be automatically listed as a plaintiff
in a lawsuit against the NFL. I have made the decision it is
not necessary for me to be part of . . . this lawsuit.71
Plaintiffs’ lawyers are not immune from public vitriol for
representing clients with unpopular claims. After the horrific

whose sensitive personal information, i.e., names, email addresses, credit card
information, and sexual preferences and habits, was contained in Avid's ‘cheating
website’ database.”).
64. Carolyn Gregoire, Ashley Madison Hack Could Have a Devastating
POST,
Aug.
20,
2015,
Psychological
Fallout,
HUFFINGTON
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/ashley-madison-hack-psychological-fallout_us_
55d4afcee4b07addcb44f5d4.
65. In re Ashley Madison, 2016 WL 1366616, at *1.
66. Id.
67. Dominique Mosbergen, Pastor Outed In Ashley Madison Hack Commits
Suicide, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 8, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/
pastor-ashley-madison-suicide_us_55efe1dbe4b03784e2771e5d.
68. Armando Salguero, Miami Dolphins legend Dan Marino withdraws name
from concussion lawsuit, MIAMI HERALD (June 3, 2014), http://www.miamiherald.
com/sports/nfl/miami-dolphins/article1965425.html.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Peter King, Dan Marino: ‘I Am Withdrawing as a Plaintiff Effective
Immediately,’ SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (June 3, 2014), http://mmqb.si.com/2014/06/03/
dan-marino-nfl-concussion-lawsuit-statement.
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shootings at Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newtown,
Connecticut, a lawyer sued the Connecticut Department of
Education on behalf of a Sandy Hook Elementary School first-grader
who suffered emotional trauma from the ordeal.72 The internet and
mass media responded to the lawsuit “with outrage—calling it
‘completely inappropriate’ and ‘wrong on every level.’”73 As a result,
the lawyer withdrew the case.74
C. Public Shaming of Named Plaintiffs
In other cases, plaintiffs who sued using their real names were
met with public scorn, threats, and ridicule. Abigail Fisher, a white
student who was denied admission to the University of Texas, sued
the school in 2008.75 She claimed that UT’s decision on her
application was a violation of the Equal Protection clause, since,
according to Fisher, the school admitted minority students with
qualifications lower than hers.76 The Twittersphere exploded with
supporters of UT’s position, and the hashtag #StayMadAbby was
created.77 People from all walks of life used the hashtag to publicly
express disdain for Fisher and her lawsuit.78 After Fisher lost before
the United States Supreme Court,79 a new hashtag was born:
#BeckywiththeBadGrades.80
In 2011, an atheist high school student, Jessica Ahlquist, sued
the City of Cranston, Rhode Island, seeking removal of a large
prayer mural posted on the wall of her high school’s auditorium.81
After she filed the lawsuit, Ahlquist was “subject to frequent
taunting and threats at school, as well as a virtual on-line hate

72. Chelsea Kelly, Mass Shooting Lawsuits Can Serve Purpose, HARTFORD
COURANT (Feb. 4, 2014), http://www.courant.com/opinion/hc-op-fresh-talk-kellymass-shooting-lawsuits-usef-20140204-story.html.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Fisher v. Texas, 556 F. Supp. 2d 603 (W.D. Tex. 2008), aff’d Fisher v. Univ.
of Tex., 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016).
76. Id.
77. Robert Bernstein, U. of Texas Supreme Court Fight Gets Hashtag:
#StayMadAbby, USA TODAY (Dec. 13, 2015), http://college.usatoday.com/2015/12/13/
u-of-texas-supreme-court-fight-gets-hashtag-staymadabby.
78. Id.
79. Fisher v. Univ. of Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016).
80. Alfred Ng, Abigail Fisher is now Becky with the Bad Grades, N.Y. DAILY
NEWS (June 23, 2016), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/abigail-fisherbecky-bad-grades-article-1.2685865.
81. See Ahlquist v. Cranston, 840 F. Supp. 2d 507 (D.R.I. 2012).
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campaign via Facebook.”82 She received death threats, many on
Twitter, and required police escorts to and from classes.83 Some of
the hateful social media comments included:





“everyone’s harassing her but who’s she going to report it
to? [The school?] The administrators probably hate her.”84
“I’m sabotaging her site on Facebook. Let’s just say it’s
going to be nuts.”85
“Jessica Ahlquist, your home address posted [sic] online.
I can’t wait to hear about you getting curb-stomped, you
fucking worthless cunt.”86
“But for real, somebody should jump the girl. LMAO—
let’s do it.” “I’ve decided I’m going to eat her family.”87

Finally, on a popular radio show, a state representative from
Ahlquist’s town called her “an evil little thing.”88 Ahlquist was
forced to take time off from school.89
While this paper’s focus is on individual rightsholders, it is worth
noting that corporate rightsholders have not been spared from being
publicly shamed for bringing unpopular lawsuits. In 2015, a
customer in Texas wrote a negative Yelp review about Prestigious
Pets, a pet-sitting company located in Dallas.90 The reviewer claimed
that the pet sitter the company provided “potentially harmed” her
82. Id. at 516.
83. See Abby Goodnough, Student Faces Town’s Wrath in Protest Against a
Prayer, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/27/us/rhodeisland-city-enraged-over-school-prayer-lawsuit.html?_r=0;
see
also
Elisabeth
Harrison, R.I. Student Draws Ire Over School Prayer Challenge, NPR (Feb. 7, 2012),
http://www.npr.org/2012/02/14/146538958/rhode-island-district-weighs-studentsprayer-lawsuit; Christina Ng, Rhode Island Teen’s Battle Against Prayer Banner Has
Gone ‘Too Far,’ Mayor Says, ABC NEWS (Jan. 18, 2012), http://abcnews.go.
com/US/rhode-island-teens-battle-prayer-banner-mayor/story?id=15386786.
84. HyperHam, Love the Sinner, Hate the Sin, FAMILY V2.1 (Feb. 23, 2012, 5:54
AM), http://www.geekfamily.co.uk/tag/religion.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Goodnough, supra note 83.
89. See Ileana Llorens, Jessica Ahlquist, Atheist, Receives Threats Over Prayer
Banner Ruling; School Board May Appeal, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 31,
2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/27/jessica-ahlquist-prayer-bannerrhode-island-school_n_1237199.html.
90. Paul Alan Levy, Texas Court Strikes Down Prestigious Pets’
Nondisparagement Clause Lawsuit, PUB. CITIZEN: CONSUMER LAW & POL’Y BLOG
(Aug. 30, 2016), http://pubcit.typepad.com/clpblog/2016/08/texas-court-strikes-downprestigious-pets-nondisparagement-clause-lawsuit.html#more.
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fish by overfeeding it while she and her husband were away on
vacation.91 Prestigious Pets sued the customer in small claims court,
alleging that her Yelp post violated a non-disparagement clause in
their contract.92 After a Dallas journalist reported on the story, it:
[W]ent viral, because the fact that a pet-sitting company
would not only have a non-disparagement clause but would
go so far as to sue its customers for mild criticism touched a
nerve. Criticism rained down on the company for its lawsuit,
and, according to the company’s affidavits, its new business
fell off sharply.93
Some of the web comments to CBS’s online story included:



“What spiteful business owners - not sure why anyone
would ever use them. I know I never would.”94
“By suing these folks Prestigious Pets is itself providing
even more bad advertising that some of its clients think it
does a poor job. Never heard of them before but because
of this I’d be wary of hiring them. And who would want to
drop off a pet with Prestigious Pets (yet more advertising)
knowing that it sues its clients? Dumb move!”95

Even Yelp itself has weighed in on the controversy.96 When
searching for reviews of Prestigious Pets of Dallas on Yelp, a
disclaimer appears, which states the following:
Consumer Alert: Questionable Legal Threats
This business may be trying to abuse the legal system in an
effort to stifle free speech, including issuing questionable

91. Id.
92. Id. (citing McWhorter v. Duchouquette, No. DC-16-03561, 2016 WL
3157322 (Tex. Dist. Mar. 28, 2016)).
93. Levy, supra note 90; See Pet sitting business bites back after getting bad
Yelp review, CBS NEWS (Feb. 19, 2016, 8:11 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/yelpnegative-online-review-texas-couple-sued-jeremy-stoppelman/.
94. Sewilliams4822, Comment to Pet sitting business bites back after getting
bad Yelp review, CBS NEWS (Feb. 19, 2016, 8:11 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/
news/yelp-negative-online-review-texas-couple-sued-jeremy-stoppelman/.
95. Rational_1, Comment to Pet sitting business bites back after getting bad
Yelp review, CBS NEWS (Feb. 19, 2016, 8:11 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/yelpnegative-online-review-texas-couple-sued-jeremy-stoppelman/.
96. See Prestigious Pets, YELP, https://www.yelp.com/biz/
prestigious-pets-dallas?osq=prestigious+pets+of+dallas (last visited Feb. 13, 2017).
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legal threats against reviewers. As a reminder, reviewers
who share their experiences have a First Amendment right to
express their opinions on Yelp.97
While the plaintiff, in this case, is certainly unsympathetic, it
should nonetheless have the right to pursue its action without the
threat of being shamed out of business. The judicial system can and
should be the arena in which the enforceability of such a nondisparagement clause is determined.
D. Judicial Response to Public Shaming of Plaintiffs
In Doe v. Jackson City School District, a group of citizens sued a
local school district for displaying a portrait of Jesus in a local
middle school.98 The plaintiffs moved for permission to proceed
anonymously, emphasizing the “bombardment of internet-based
speech against [them]”99 and that “[s]ocial media sites appear to be
the hotbed of this threatening and harassing activity.”100 On
Facebook, users had made threats of physical violence and even
veiled threats of using guns to commit acts of physical violence.101
Some of the Facebook posts included:






“Hunt down whoever complained and get them.”102
“if they remove the picture I think it might get a little
ugly in this small town & [sic] it will turn so quickly they
won’t have a chance 2 [sic] get away! I can’t stand people
like this.”103
“Find out who complained about it and settle this out in
the parking lot.”104
“But, alas, I believe in freedom of speech unconditionally
unless it lessons [sic] or severs my Liberties and
Freedoms . . . in which case I must invoke my 2nd

97. Id.
98. Doe v. Jackson City Sch. Dist., No. 2:13-cv-112, 2013 WL 452918, at*1 (S.D.
Ohio Feb. 7, 2013).
99. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed Using
Pseudonyms at 7–8, Doe v. Jackson City Sch. Dist., No. 2:13-cv-112, 2013 WL
9123171 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 7, 2013).
100. Jackson City Sch. Dist., 2013 WL 9123171, at 8.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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Ammendment [sic] Rights upon you and your unjust
endeavors.”105
Some suggested that the plaintiffs should kill themselves while
others wished eternal damnation upon them.106 More resorted to
insults and name calling, characterizing the plaintiffs as Satan
worshippers.107 Others suggested that whoever the plaintiffs were
that opposed the hanging of the picture of Jesus should leave the
country or find another school.108 The court agreed that the social
media activity in the case gave the plaintiffs good reason to fear
social ostracism, harassment, intimidation, and violence, and
granted the plaintiffs’ motion allowing them to proceed
anonymously.109
In contrast, in Doe v. Kamehameha Schools,110 the plaintiffs were
four students who sued certain Hawaiian private schools and their
trustees for their allegedly race-based admissions policy which
granted admission to any applicant with any amount of Native
Hawaiian blood before admitting other applicants.111 In fact, the

105. Id.
106. One commenter wrote: “It’s about time someone stood up and told the antiChrist nut cases to take a flying leap off a tall building!” Memorandum in Support of
Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed Using Pseudonyms at 9, Jackson City Sch.
Dist., 2013 WL 9123171. Another commenter wrote, “To those who want it down,
when you die I hope God sends you ‘down’. You wacko, sicko liberals are denying
others their constitutional rights! Go find a deserted island and start a Liberal
Colony. You are as much wanted in GOD’S COUNTRY as the lepers!” Id. at 10.
107. A commenter stated, “What a shame, This group That wants It taken Down
is Of Satan.” Id. at 9.
108. A commenter wrote, “I am not even a huge Christian and believe the
complainer and this so called 19,000 member cult are Fucking crazy. If they don’t
like it, go to school somewhere else.” Id. Another commenter wrote: “No one told you
that you had to look at it. If you have a problem with it then don’t go into the middle
school.” Id. Another posted: “Pardon my French, but these assholes need to get away
from our schools PERIOD . . . get the hell out of our states, our region and our
schools.” Id.
109. Doe v. Jackson City Sch. Dist., No. 2:13-cv-112, 2013 WL 452918 (S.D. Ohio
Feb. 7, 2013).
110. Doe v. Kamehameha Schs., 596 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. Haw. 2010). For a brief
review of this case, see Julie Hilden, Should Juvenile Plaintiffs Who Fear Reprisals
Be Able to Keep Their Identities Secret? The Question Divides the U.S. Court of
(November
23,
2010),
Appeals
for
the
Ninth
Circuit,
FINDLAW
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/hilden/20101123.html.
111. Kamehameha Schs., 596 F.3d at 1038.
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schools only had admitted two students of non-Hawaiian descent
from 1966–2002.112
After news broke in local newspapers that the magistrate judge
denied the plaintiffs’ motion to proceed anonymously, numerous
vitriolic comments were posted to the newspapers’ online forums.113
The plaintiffs moved to reargue the motion to proceed anonymously,
citing a number of the threatening online comments as evidence that
the plaintiffs reasonably feared retaliatory physical harm should
their identities be made public.114 The comments included:





“Good that the judge ordered them to make these little
brats [sic] names known to the public, so they can be
tormented by their fellow students and general public.”115
The “4 kids . . . will need 10 bodyguards lol.”116
“Sacrifice them!!!!!!!!!”117
“Now stringing up those scum lawyers is not such a bad
idea. (Don’t be scared, it’s in the Halloween spirit).”118

One commenter noted that if the plaintiffs’ identities became
known, they “would have to watch their backs for the rest of their
lives!”119 Even the plaintiffs’ attorney received threatening emails.120
The district court was not persuaded that either these comments or
those presented in the initial motion provided reasonable grounds
for the plaintiffs to fear retaliatory physical harm.121 On appeal, the
Ninth Circuit emphasized that it was constrained by the “abuse of
discretion standard of review” and stated, “were we permitted to

112. Id. at 1039; See also David M. Forman, The Hawaiian Usage Exception to
the Common Law: An Inoculation Against the Effects of Western Influence, 30 U.
HAW. L. REV. 319, 331 (2008).
113. Kamehameha Schs., 596 F.3d at 1041.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. The sender of one email wrote: “You are a son of a bitch . . .I know so many
kids that did not get into Kamehameha schools with Hawaiian blood and you are
trying to take that away . . . I am tired of haoles [a Hawaiian pejorative for “white
person”] like you. yOU JEWISH SHITHEAD!!!! if i see you ever in public.. no worries
. . . I will SPIT on you … and YOU will throw the first punch . . . and believe me . . . it
will be my pleasure to beat the crap out of you . . . by the way . . . i am a NON
Hawaiian. . . .” Id. (emphasis added).
121. Doe v. Kamehameha Schs., No. 08–00359, 2009 WL 308351, at *6 (D. Haw.
Feb. 6, 2009).
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make findings and weigh the facts anew, we might have held that
anonymity was appropriate.”122 With that caveat, the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the district court decision to deny the plaintiffs
anonymity.123
In a 2012 case, Doe v. Pittsylvania County, the plaintiff sued the
County and the local Board of Supervisors challenging, as
unconstitutional, the Board’s practice of opening meetings with a
Christian prayer.124 Locals took to the internet to voice their
displeasure.125 Some posted alarming and arguably threatening,
comments in response to the litigation.126 One such post stated
“people will do anything for money . . . just hope this person that was
soooo offended is smart enough not to make himself known . . . it
would not be a good thing I’m sure . . . just saying karma don’t know
God either.”127 The district court, however, denied the plaintiff’s
request to proceed anonymously, holding that the comments directed
at the plaintiff did not specifically threaten violence and the ones
that did were directed at the American Civil Liberties Union, the
entity bringing the lawsuit on the plaintiff’s behalf.128 The court
blithely noted that “[l]awsuits about religion frequently have a
tendency to inflame unreasonably some individuals,” and “[w]hile it
cannot be denied that the record, in this case, contains some
indications of disapproval and frustration by some local citizens for
bringing this suit . . . , this evidence does not establish the need for
anonymity.”129 The Court found that lack of specific evidence of
retaliatory physical harm militated against granting the plaintiff
leave to proceed anonymously.130
In the 2007 case of Doe v. Pleasant Valley School District, the
plaintiffs, a group of adults who complained about a high school
history teacher, alleged the teacher “showed his history class
‘photographs of naked and dismembered’ women, made
inappropriate sexual comments to students and provided a sexually
explicit book to his class of sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds.”131 The

122. Kamehameha Schs., 596 F.3d at 1046.
123. Id.
124. Doe v. Pittsylvania Cty., 844 F. Supp.2d 724, 727 (W.D. Va. 2012).
125. Id. at 736.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 737.
128. Id. at 735.
129. Id. at 738 (internal citations omitted).
130. Id. at 742.
131. Doe v. Pleasant Valley Sch. Dist., No. 3:07cv854, 2007 WL 2234514, at *1
(M.D. Pa. Aug. 1, 2007).
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plaintiffs moved to proceed anonymously, arguing that exposing
their identities would put them and their families at risk.132 The
plaintiffs cited statements an unidentified student made on a blog,
claiming that the plaintiffs “were not releasing their names because
they know about a hundred people will go chase them down with
torches and pitchforks as soon as their names come out.”133 The
district court denied the plaintiffs’ motion to proceed
pseudonymously, reasoning that the statement was not “a direct
threat to the plaintiffs or their family, but more likely idle chatter
about public attitudes towards the plaintiffs’ claim.”134 The court
instructed the plaintiffs to file an amended complaint that stated
their real names within ten days or else the court would dismiss the
complaint.135
Recently, the court in the Central District of California denied
the plaintiff’s motion to proceed anonymously in the civil case
involving accusations of rape by basketball star Derrick Rose.136 The
judge reasoned that allowing the plaintiff to proceed anonymously
“would communicate ‘a subliminal comment on the harm the alleged
encounter with the defendant has caused the plaintiff.’”137 When the
Washington Post published a story about the judge’s decision to deny
the plaintiff anonymity,138 some of the online comments included:


“REAL Rape victims feel a strong sense of shame and
need for privacy. Not the need to go on a world tour. The

132. Id.
133. Id. at *3.
134. Id. See also, Publius v. Boyer-Vine, No. 1:16-CV-1152-LJO-SKO, 2017 WL
1881463, at *2 (E.D. Cal. May 9, 2017) (stating “the reasonableness of [plaintiff’s]
fear of physical and economic harm is not sufficient reason to grant him
anonymity . . . [Plaintiff] has received ‘only a small number of even arguably
threatening online comments, with no indication that anyone actually had the
intention to carry them out.’”).
135. Pleasant Valley Sch. Dist., 2007 WL 2234514, at *4.
136. See Order Case 2:15-cv-07503-MWF-JC Document 264 Filed 09/22/16 Page
4 of 6 Page ID #:9794; See also Joel Rubin, A rape lawsuit against NBA star Derrick
Rose raises key question: Should an accuser be allowed to stay anonymous? L.A.
TIMES (Oct. 3, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-rose-rapelawsuit-anonymous-20161003-snap-story.html.
137. See Order Case 2:15-cv-07503-MWF-JC Document 264, Page ID #:9794, 6
(September 22, 2016) (quoting Doe v. Cabrera, 307 F.R.D. 1, 10 (D.D.C. 2014)
(internal citation omitted).
138. Katie Mettler, Gang-rape accuser of NBA’s Derrick Rose must reveal her
name at civil trial, judge rules, WASH. POST (Sept. 21, 2016), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2016/09/21/derrick-rose-gang-rapeaccuser-must-reveal-her-name-at-upcoming-civil-trial-judge-rules/#comments.
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rule was created to protect REAL VICTIMS, but as usual,
there are those who will abuse it.”139
“Interesting: No criminal charges were filed, and the
woman is suing them, yet wants to maintain her
anonymity? I smell a greedy groupie who did not get what
she thought she was gonna get for a night of partying and
is seeking vengeance.”140
E. Public Shaming and Social Media

Rapid technological advances are making the need for plaintiff
pseudonymity even more compelling. Both computers and the
internet are getting faster,141 so individuals are consuming more
content than ever at unprecedented speeds.142 Additionally, the
number of people using the internet and the amount of time they
spend on it each day have increased dramatically.143 Young people,

139. Scoeman Scoen, Comment to Gang-rape accuser of NBA’s Derrick Rose must
reveal her name at civil trial, judge rules, WASH. POST (Sept. 9, 2016, 1:50 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2016/09/21/derrick-rosegang-rape-accuser-must-reveal-her-name-at-upcoming-civil-trial-judgerules/#comments.
140. Realilty Check 2013, Comment to Gang-rape accuser of NBA’s Derrick Rose
must reveal her name at civil trial, judge rules, WASH. POST (Sept. 9, 2016, 8:55 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2016/09/21/derrick-rosegang-rape-accuser-must-reveal-her-name-at-upcoming-civil-trial-judgerules/#comments.
141. For example, in 2002, it took twelve and a half minutes to download a song
on a 56K modem; by 2012, a song could be downloaded in eighteen seconds. See Pam
Dyer, How the Internet has Changed in the Last 10 Years, PAMORAMA,
http://pamorama.net/2012/10/06/how-the-internet-has-changed-in-the-last-10-yearsinfographic/ (last visted Oct. 1, 2016); see also John Aziz, Why is American Internet so
Slow?, THE WEEK (March 5, 2014), http://theweek.com/articles/449919/whyamerican-internet-slow.
142. See Eric Griffith, How Fast Is Your Internet Connection – Really?,
PCMAG.COM, http://www.pcmag.com/speedtest (last updated Aug. 31, 2016).
143. In 2005, there were an estimated 1 billion internet users world-wide. In
2010, that number rose to 2 billion, and in 2014, it rose to 3 billion. See Internet
Users, INTERNET LIVE STATS, http://www.internetlivestats.com/internet-users/ (last
visited Sept. 10, 2017); see also H.O. Maycotte, A Gift for the World Wide Web on its
25th Birthday: A Bill of Rights, FORBES (Aug. 19, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
homaycotte/2014/08/19/a-gift-for-the-world-wide-web-on-its-25th-birthday-a-bill-ofrights/#733da95f31f8 (stating that “[i]n 2000, 5% of the world population used the
World Wide Web. [In 2014] that number [was] 40%, and rapidly growing as mobile
technologies find their way to the more remote areas of the globe”). In 2002, the
average internet user spent approximately forty-six (46) minutes per day on the
internet. By 2012, this average increased to approximately four (4) hours per day.
See Pam Dyer, How the Internet has Changed in the Last 10 Years, PAMORAMA,
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including children, are particularly proficient in using technology
and spend worrisome amounts of time “plugged-in” on the
internet.144 Even the number of websites one can visit today is
considerably greater than it was in 2004.145 Facebook, which was in
its infancy in 2004, has grown to over 1 billion accounts.146
These technological advances serve to heighten the concerns of
rightsholders who want to remain anonymous. Via social media,
information spreads faster than ever. Moreover, because Americans
are increasingly abandoning traditional news sources in favor of
getting their news from social media applications with push
notifications like Twitter, consumers no longer have to seek out their
news—it comes directly to them.147 Therefore, when a plaintiff files a

http://pamorama.net/2012/10/06/how-the-internet-has-changed-in-the-last-10-yearsinfographic/ (last visted Oct. 1, 2016). For further statistical information pertaining
to the dramatic growth of the internet, see Global Internet Population Grows an
Average of Four Percent Year-Over-Year, NEILSEN-NETRATINGS (Feb. 20, 2003),
http://nielsen-online.com/pr/pr_030220.pdf; SASI Group & Mark Newman, Internet
Users 2002, WORLD MAPPER (2006), http://worldmapper.org/posters/worldmapper_
map336_ver5.pdf.
144. Teens spend almost 9 hours a day using media. See Kelly Wallace, Teens
spend a 'mind-boggling' 9 hours a day using media, report says, CNN (Nov. 3, 2015,
9:07 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/11/03/health/teens-tweens-media-screen-usereport/; see also Hayley Tsukayama, Teens spend nearly nine hours every day
consuming media, WASH. POST (Nov. 3, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/the-switch/wp/2015/11/03/teens-spend-nearly-nine-hours-every-dayconsuming-media/. “Research by the Kaiser Family Foundation suggests that the
average youth between the ages of eight and eighteen spends every permissible
waking moment using electronic devices, many of which (like smart phones and
computers) are connected to the Internet.” Jay P. Kesan, Carol M. Hayes, & Masooda
N. Bashir, A Comprehensive Empirical Study of Data Privacy, Trust, and Consumer
Autonomy, 91 IND. L.J. 267, 285 (2016).
145. It is estimated that in 2004 there were 51,611,646 websites and
910,060,180 users; in 2013, there were 672,985,183 websites and 2,756,198,420
users. Total Number of Websites, INTERNET LIVE STATS, http://www.internetlivestats.
com/total-number-of-websites/#trend (last visited Oct. 10, 2016). “It must be noted
that around 75% of websites today are not active, but parked domains or similar.” Id.
(citing How Many Active Sites Are There?, NETCRAFT (Oct. 10, 2014),
http://www.netcraft.com/active-sites/).
146. See Facebook – Statistics and Facts, STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/
statistics/264810/number-of-monthly-active-facebook-users-worldwide/ (last visited
Sept. 10, 2017).
147. See generally Paul Sawers, Breaking News For Android Now Delivers Alerts
Based On Your Proximity To The Breaking News, THE NEXT WEB (Aug. 22, 2014),
http://thenextweb.com/apps/2014/08/22/breaking-news-proximity-alerts-android/; The
Personal News Cycle: How Americans Choose to get their News, THE AM. PRESS INST.
(Mar. 17, 2014), https://www.americanpressinstitute.org/publications/reports/surveyresearch/personal-news-cycle/ (“Nearly half of Americans with internet access have
signed up for news alerts.”); John Sutter, Theater Shooting Unfolds In Real Time On
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suit using her real name, that plaintiff’s identity and her claim can
swiftly be revealed to millions of people.
Conversely, under the veil of anonymity that posting on the
internet provides, internet users are willing to say things that they
otherwise would not.148 Additionally, due to groupthink—or “hive
mind” in internet parlance—an insult a single commenter lobs can
result in a never-ending cascade of threats, name-calling, ridicule,
and vitriolic harassment.149 Danielle Citron noted that “the Internet
magnifies the dangerousness of group behavior . . . . Online groups
affirm each other’s negative views, which become even more extreme
and destructive.”150 If the plaintiff has a social media account of her
own with even the smallest amount of personal information, unease
about harassment may become exponentially more visceral if a
vindictive internet user retrieves and posts that information for
others with similar disdain for the plaintiff. Concerns about
harassment may transform into a reasonable fear of real-life,
retaliatory physical violence.151 Thus, if denied the ability to pursue
a legitimate claim pseudonymously, many rightsholders are forced to

Social Media, CNN (July 20, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/07/20/tech/socialmedia/colorado-shooting-social-media/ (reporting that news of the Aurora, Colorado
movie theatre shooting broke via first-hand accounts on Twitter, for example, before
news outlets could even report the story).
148. See Cyberspace Complainers Counteract Stress And Command Power, U. OF
ROCKIES (Oct. 25, 2011), http://rockies.mediaroom.com/index.php?s=15659&item
=73653 (reporting on Dr. David C. Solly’s conclusion that “[w]e feel we are reaching
more people when we use social media as a vehicle. . . . Complaining via social media
gives the person a feeling of commanding great power and control over their
situation.”). See also Joe Greenhill, From the Playground to Cyberspace: The history
of Cyberbullying, 5 CHARLESTON L. REV. 4 (2011) (discussing internet anonymity and
the exacerbation of bullying).
149. Tim Adams, How The Internet Created An Age of Rage, THE GUARDIAN
(July
23,
2011),
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2011/jul/24/internetanonymity-trolling-tim-adams (“The big problem [a Los Angeles Times reporter]
finds running the blog is that his anonymous commenters get a kind of pack
mentality. And the comments quickly become a one-note invective.”); MARY CROSS,
BLOGGERATI, TWITTERATI: HOW BLOGS AND TWITTER ARE TRANSFORMING POPULAR
CULTURE 62 (“critics of twitter point to the predominance of the hive mind in such
social media, the kind of groupthink that submerges independent thinking in favor of
conformity to the group, the collective.”). Recently, comedian Leslie Jones deleted her
twitter account as a result of throngs of repulsive, hateful comments. See Kristen V.
Brown, How a Racist, Sexist Hate Mob Forced Leslie Jones off Twitter, FUSION (July
19, 2016, 12:52 PM), Fusion.net/story/327103/leslie-jones-twitter-racism/.
150. Citron, supra note 41 at 83 (citing Patricia Wallace, The Psychology of the
Internet 79 (1999)).
151. See discussion of cases supra Part I. D.
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assess whether vindicating their rights is worth suffering the public
response that will result from doing so.
Indeed, public shaming has become so powerful that it can, in a
matter of seconds, ruin lives. Daniel Solove noted that “[a] plethora
of websites now serve as forums for people to shame others.”152 Jon
Ronson, author of So You’ve been Publicly Shamed, cautioned that
“we are destroying people, routinely, daily . . . with the thing we are
most terrified would happen to us.”153 “The great thing about social
media was that it gave a voice to voiceless people. But we are now
creating a surveillance society where the smartest way to survive is
to go back to being voiceless.”154 Ronson observed, “[o]n Twitter we
make our own decisions about who deserves obliteration.”155
One example of the power of social media is the case of Justine
Sacco.156 Sacco sent one short tweet, allegedly made in jest,157 that
destroyed her life.158 In December 2013, Ms. Sacco was traveling by
air from New York to Cape Town.159 During a layover in Heathrow,
Ms. Sacco tweeted to her 170 followers: “Going to Africa. Hope I
don’t get AIDS. Just kidding. I’m white!”160 By the time Ms. Sacco
had boarded the plane in London, someone sent her tweet to a
journalist at Gawker, who subsequently retweeted it to his 15,000
followers.161 And then, before Sacco landed in Cape Town eleven

152. SOLOVE, supra note 24, at 86.
153. How social media led to a renaissance of public shaming, PBS NEWSHOUR
(May 18, 2015, 6:15 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/social-media-ledrenaissance-public-shaming/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2016).
154. Jon Ronson, When online shaming spirals out of control, TED TALKS (July
2015), https://www.ted.com/talks/jon_ronson_what_happens_when_online_shaming_
spirals_out_of_control/transcript?language=en.
155. RONSON, supra note 32, at 187.
156. Id. at 68.
157. Sacco said, “[O]nly an insane person would think that white people don’t get
AIDS. To me, it was so insane . . . I thought there was no way that anyone could
possibly think it was a literal statement.” Id. at 68. “It was a joke about a dire
situation . . . that we don’t pay attention to.” Id. at 73. Noted Ronson, “[i]t seemed
obvious that her tweet, whilst not a great joke, wasn’t racist, but a reflexive comment
on white privilege.” Id.
158. RONSON, supra note 32, at 68.
159. Id.
160. Id. “What the world didn’t know, is that she had been tweeting ‘little
acerbic jokes’ to her Twitter followers about her holiday travels. One such tweet read
“Weird German Dude [a fellow passenger on her airplane flight]: You’re in first class.
It’s 2014 Get some deodorant. – Inner monolog as I inhale BO. Thank god for
pharmaceuticals.” Id. Following that tweet, Sacco wrote about her layover in London
“Chili—cucumber sandwiches—bad teeth. Back in London!” Id.
161. Id. at 78.
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hours later,162 her tweet was “the number one world-wide trend on
Twitter.”163 As a result of the tweet, Ms. Sacco was fired from her
job.164 Her extended family in South Africa, strong supporters of the
end of apartheid, told her that she “almost tarnished the family.”165
Sacco went to live in Ethiopia after the scandal hit.166 Said Sacco, “I
cried out my body weight.”167 According to Ronson, social media
“annihilated” her.168
Another well-known example of the power of social media
involves the killing of Cecil the lion.169 In the summer of 2015, while
on a hunting trip in Zimbabwe, American dentist Walter Palmer

162. While Sacco was mid-air, her employer became aware of the tweet. It
responded with the statement: “This is an outrageous, offensive comment. Employee
in question currently unreachable on an into [sic] flight.” Soon, “[t]he hashtag
‘#HasJustineLandedYet’ began trending worldwide as people were desperate to see
how she would react to the thousands of angry tweets and the fact her job was now
under threat.” See Lucy Waterlow, 'I lost my job, my reputation and I'm not able to
date anymore': Former PR worker reveals how she destroyed her life one year after
sending 'racist' tweet before trip to Africa, DAILY MAIL (Feb. 16, 2015, 5:49 PM),
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/femail/article-2955322/Justine-Sacco-reveals-destroyedlife-racist-tweet-trip-Africa.html#ixzz4F0OBEopl.
163. RONSON, supra note 32, at 69. See also Jon Ronson, How One Stupid Tweet
Blew Up Justine Sacco’s Life, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 12, 2015), http://www.nytimes.
com/2015/02/15/magazine/how-one-stupid-tweet-ruined-justine-saccos-life.html?_r=0
(“By the time Sacco had touched down, tens of thousands of angry tweets had been
sent in response to her joke. [Sacco’s friend] meanwhile, frantically deleted her
friend’s tweet and her account—Sacco didn’t want to look—but it was far too late.
“Sorry @JustineSacco,” wrote one Twitter user, “your tweet lives on forever.”).
164. Will Heilpern, A writer who spent years following people whose lives were
ruined by Twitter says online abuse is why the site is shrinking, BUSINESS INSIDER
(April 20, 2016), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/femail/article-2955322/Justine-Saccoreveals-destroyed-life-racist-tweet-trip-Africa.html; Lucy Waterlow, 'I lost my job, my
reputation and I'm not able to date anymore': Former PR worker reveals how she
destroyed her life one year after sending 'racist' tweet before trip to Africa, DAILY
MAIL (Feb. 16, 2015, 5:49 PM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/femail/article-2955322/
Justine-Sacco-reveals-destroyed-life-racist-tweet-trip-Africa.html#ixzz4F0OBEopl.
165. RONSON, supra note 32, at 77.
166. Ronson, supra note 163.
167. Dustin Rowles, What Happened To Justine Sacco, The Woman Whose Life
Was Ruined By An AIDS Joke She Made on Twitter, UPROXX (Feb. 2, 2015),
http://uproxx.com/webculture/what-happened-to-justine-sacco-the-woman-whose-lifewas-ruined-by-an-aids-joke-she-made-on-twitter/.
168. RONSON, supra note 32, at 276.
169. Author’s full disclosure: in the summer of 2015 when Walter Palmer shot
Cecil the lion, I posted on my personal Facebook page a meme that had been
circulating on social media. The meme contained a picture of a trophy, a lion, and
Palmer. The caption under the trophy read “trophy,” the caption under the lion read
“king,” and the caption under Palmer read “asshole.” Jayne S. Ressler, FACEBOOK
(July 28, 2015), https://www.facebook.com/jayne.ressler/posts/10207406452458327.
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legally shot and killed Cecil the lion.170 After news of his kill became
public, the internet went into a frenzy.171 Social media users from
around the globe “called him a ‘scumbag’ and a ‘disgrace to
humankind, and a detriment to our species as a whole.’ The address,
website and phone number of his practice were plastered
everywhere, with the practice’s website going down shortly
thereafter.”172 Palmer’s private address and phone numbers were
posted on Twitter.173 One British Twitter user tweeted, “I genuinely
wouldn’t care if Walter Palmer was found by a lynch mob and strung
up,”174 while a Canadian user posted, “Walt Palmer – Cecil the
beloved lion’s murderer. Have at him.”175
In August, 2015, Yelp chose to remove over 7,000 reviews on
Walter Palmer’s dental practice page, stating that they violated
Yelp’s “terms of service.”176 One such review had read, “[b]rought my
lion here for dentistry and was horrified by the result. All kidding
aside, I hope you die painfully.”177 Another said:
I wasn’t sure if I was getting my tooth fixed or setting out on
an African jungle safari—there were lion pelt chairs, lion
heads hanging from the walls and elephant tusk umbrella
stands. Inside his work space was even weirder—his chair
(he informed me) was made out of the skin of a 1000 [sic]
innocent baby seals he had so bravely clubbed to death.178

170. See Cecil the lion: No Charges for Walter Palmer, says Zimbabwe, BBC
NEWS (Oct. 12, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-34508269 (“Mr. Palmer
broke no laws when he killed the lion using a bow and arrow.”).
171. See The hunting of Walter Palmer: Internet goes after ‘lion killer’ US dentist,
RT QUESTION MORE (July 28, 2015), https://www.rt.com/usa/311002-dentist-lioninternet-hunt/.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Adam Heath (@adamheath), TWITTER (July 28, 2015, 11:10 AM),
https://twitter.com /adamheath/status/626062083512225792.
175. Diane Fraleigh (@Casey_Pup), (July 28, 2015, 9:56 AM), https://twitter.com/
Casey_Pup/status/626043544071835648.
176. Dale Lately, A One-Star Human Being, SLATE (Aug. 21, 2015),
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2015/08/lion_killing_dentist_w
alter_palmer_s_yelp_page_and_the_business_of_internet.html. Ironically, Yelp itself
was shamed for removing the posts. A petition was created with the slogan, “Yelp:
Post the Reviews!” Id.
177. harmoleon, 10 “Best” Yelp Reviews For That Dentist That Killed Cecil The
Lion, BREAK, http://www.break.com/article/10-best-yelp-reviews-for-dentist-walterpalmer-lion-2876455.
178. Id.
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Indeed, there is currently a Facebook group page called “Arrest
Walter James Palmer.” As of last check, there are 21,484 members of
that Facebook group.179
Recognizing the tremendous damaging power of the internet, the
European Commission has proposed a regulation to give all
European citizens the “right to be forgotten online.”180 The basic
premise of the law is that it “will give all European Union citizens a
right . . . for the individual user to have his or her personal online
data removed from the web.”181 The Court of Justice of the European
Union has already ruled in favor of a citizen’s right to be forgotten
online, under a precursor to the current proposed regulation.182 That
court ordered Google to remove links to newspaper articles about a
Spanish citizen, which “although truthful, injured his reputation and
invaded his privacy.”183
Permitting certain rightsholders to proceed pseudonymously is
especially important in the United States where there is no legal
“right to be forgotten.” Indeed, Daniel Solove has dubbed the
Internet “a cruel historian.”184 He observed:

179. Arrest Walter James Palmer, FACEBOOK (last visited Aug. 18, 2017),
https://www.facebook.com/saveafricanwildlife/.
180. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, FACTSHEET ON THE ‘RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN”
(C-131/12),
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/files/factsheets/
RULING
factsheet_data_protection_en.pdf; see also Patricia S. Abril & Jacqueline D. Lipton,
The Right to be Forgotten: Who Decides what the World Forgets?, 103 KY. L.J. 363
(2014-15); Jeffrey Rosen, The Right to be Forgotten, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 88
(2012); Michael L. Rustad & Sanna Kulevska, Reconceptualizing the Right to Be
Forgotten to Enable Transatlantic Data Flow, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 349, 352 (2015).
The details of this law and the rights it implicates are beyond the scope of this paper.
181. Rustad supra note 180, at 353 (citing Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v.
Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (May 13, 2013), http://curia.europa.
eu/juris/document/document.jsf? text=&docid=152065&doclang=EN).
182. Id. at 363 n. 81.
183. Id. The plaintiff in Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de
Datos alleged that a Google search of his name generated a link to a newspaper
article in which it was revealed that he had failed to pay debts many years earlier.
Recently an Italian woman committed suicide after sexually explicit videos of her
went viral on the internet. See James Masters & Livia Borghese, Tiziana Canton’s
family Calls for Justice after Suicide over Sex Tape, CNN (Sept. 16, 2016),
http://www.cnn.com/2016/09/16/europe/tiziana-cantone-sex-tape-suicide/index.html.
Although she won the right to be forgotten online, and had even moved and changed
her name, she was unable to escape the public shaming that resulted from the viral
video. Id. See also Rachel Krishna, This Woman Killed Herself After Her Leaked Sex
Tape Became A Meme, BUZZFEED (Sept. 15, 2016), https://www.buzzfeed.com/
krishrach/this-woman-reportedly-killed-herself-after-an-explicitvideo?utm_term=.qhe3p1xpra#.lixa8z28wA.
184. SOLOVE, supra note 24, at 11 (quoting a post on a blogger’s page regarding
South Korea’s “internet-made famous” “dog-poop girl”).
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One of the chief drawbacks of Internet shaming is the
permanence of its effects. Internet shaming creates an
indelible blemish on a person’s identity. Being shamed in
cyberspace is akin to being marked for life. It’s similar to
being forced to wear a digital scarlet letter or being branded
or tattooed. People acquire permanent digital baggage. They
are unable to escape their past, which is forever etched into
Google’s memory.185
II. CURRENT STATE OF PSEUDONYMOUS PLAINTIFFS
A. LEGISLATION ADDRESSING PSEUDONYMOUS PLAINTIFFS
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not provide for the use of
a pseudonym by a plaintiff.186 While many state statutes specifically
provide for plaintiff anonymity in cases involving minors, sexual
abuse, domestic relations, or sensitive medical issues,187 most state
statutes mirror the federal rules, which require that “[t]he title of
the complaint must name all the parties.”188
Several states, however, have codified legislation directly
addressing anonymous plaintiffs in a broader context. Alaska Rules
of Court–Rules of Administration 40(b) provide:
The presiding judge of a judicial district may direct the clerk
of the court to substitute the pseudonym “Jane Doe” or “John
Doe” or initials for a party’s true name on the public index if
the presiding judge finds that the issues in the case involve
matters of a sensitive and highly personal nature, that
publication of the name could expose a person to harassment,
injury, ridicule, or personal embarrassment, and that

185. Id. at 94. A noted philosopher wrote that “[s]hame punishments . . . are
ways of marking a person . . . with a degraded identity. . . . Shame punishments
make the statement ‘[y]ou are a defective type of person.’” Id. at 95 (quoting MARTHA
C. NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY: DISGUST, SHAME, AND THE LAW 230, 235
(2004)).
186. FED. R. CIV. P. 10; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 5.2(a) (permitting minors to
proceed using their initials).
187. See Filing Pseudonymously By State, WITHOUTMYCONSENT.ORG,
http://www.withoutmyconsent.org/50state/filing-pseudonymously/state.
188. FED. R. CIV. PRO. 10(a); see also FED. R. CIV. PRO. 17(a)(1) (“[a]n action
must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest”). For a compilation of
state statutes’ filing requirements regarding parties’ names, see Filing
http://www.without
Pseudonymously
By
State,
WITHOUTMYCONSENT.ORG,
myconsent.org/50state/filing-pseudonymously/state.
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protection of the party’s name outweighs the public’s interest
in disclosure and any prejudice to the opposing party.189
A provision of the Connecticut Civil Practice Rules states
that:
[p]seudonyms may be used in place of the name of a party or
parties only with the prior approval of the judicial authority
and only if the judicial authority concludes that such order is
necessary to preserve an interest which is determined to
override the public’s interest in knowing the name of the
party or parties.190
In Illinois, a provision in the Code of Civil Procedure states that
“[u]pon application and for good cause shown the parties may appear
under fictitious names.”191 A section of the Virginia Civil Practice
Code, entitled “Anonymous plaintiff; motion for identification;
factors to be considered by court” provides detailed procedures for a
plaintiff to follow when seeking to proceed under a pseudonym.192

189. ALASKA R. OF ADMIN. 40(b).
190. CONN. PRACTICE BOOK § 11–20A(h)(1).
191. ILL. CODE OF CIV. PRACTICE 735 ILCS 5/2–401(e).
192. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01–15.1. The text provides: “A. In any legal proceeding
commenced anonymously, any party may move for an order concerning the propriety
of anonymous participation in the proceeding. The trial court may allow maintenance
of the proceeding under a pseudonym if the anonymous litigant discharges the
burden of showing special circumstances such that the need for anonymity outweighs
the public's interest in knowing the party's identity and outweighs any prejudice to
any other party. The court may consider whether the requested anonymity is
intended merely to avoid the annoyance and criticism that may attend any litigation
or is to preserve privacy in a sensitive and highly personal matter; whether
identification poses a risk of retaliatory physical or mental harm to the requesting
party or to innocent nonparties; the ages of the persons whose privacy interests are
sought to be protected; whether the action is against a governmental or private
party; and the risk of unfairness to other parties if anonymity is maintained. B. If
the court initially permits a party to proceed anonymously, the issue of the propriety
of continued anonymous participation in the proceedings may be raised at any stage
of the litigation when circumstances warrant a reconsideration of the issue. In all
cases, all parties have the right to know the true identities of all other parties under
such provisions of confidentiality as the court may deem appropriate. C. If the court
orders that the anonymous litigant be identified, the pleadings and any relevant
dockets shall be reformed to reflect the party's true name, and the identification
shall be deemed to relate back to the date of filing of the proceeding by the
anonymous party. D. In any legal proceeding in which a party is proceeding
anonymously, the court shall enter appropriate orders to afford all parties the rights,
procedures and discovery to which they are otherwise entitled.”
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In one case from Arkansas, the state’s highest court urged the
state legislature to consider legislation addressing pseudonymous
plaintiffs.193 The Supreme Court of Arkansas noted that “appellants’
counsel urged this court to consider adopting rules to provide
guidance on this issue in future litigation. We agree that some rules
in this area are essential, and therefore, we refer this matter to the
Civil Practice Committee.”194
B. Case Law Addressing Pseudonymous Plaintiffs
1. Federal Cases
The legal landscape regarding pseudonymous plaintiffs has
changed little, despite the explosive growth of modern technology
and cyberspace.195 The United States Supreme Court has implicitly
condoned the practice of pseudonymous plaintiffs in several cases,
most recently in 2013.196 In most of these cases the Supreme Court
did not address the plaintiff’s use of a pseudonym, simply permitting
its use without reference. In other cases, the Supreme Court briefly
193. See Doe v. Weiss, No. 09–1071, 2010 WL 1253216 (Ark. Apr. 1, 2010).
194. Id. at *3.
195. It is likely impossible to thoroughly research the prevalence of the use of
anonymous plaintiffs, since the propriety of their use “is frequently resolved in oral
or written orders that do not end up in published reporters or searchable legal
databases like Westlaw or Lexis, making the precedent harder to find.” Tom Isler,
White Paper: Anonymous Civil Litigants, RCFP.ORG, https://www.rcfp.org/browsemedia-law-resources/news-media-law/news-media-and-law-fall-2015/white-paperanonymous-civil-l#_ftn10. Additionally, courts often permit plaintiffs to use a
pseudonym without analyzing the issue. See infra Part II.B. Furthermore, plaintiffs
have used several different monikers, including Doe such as “Boe, Coe, Foe, Hoe,
Koe, Loe, Moe, Noe, Poe, Soe, Voe, Woe, and Zoe. Some pseudonyms are descriptive
(‘Pseudonym Taxpayer,’ ‘Patient A’), while others are more evocative (‘Jane
Endangered,’ ‘Unwitting Victim’). Still others fail to announce their fiction: ‘Alfred
Little,’ ‘David Becker.’ And then there are litigants who proceed only by their
initials.” Tom Isler, White Paper: Anonymous Civil Litigants, RCFP.ORG,
https://www.rcfp.org/browse-media-law-resources/news-media-law/news-media-andlaw-fall-2015/white-paper-anonymous-civil-l#_ftn10.
196. See, e.g., Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S.Ct. 2552 (2013); Doe v.
Reed, 561 U.S. 186 (2010); City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77 (2004)
(pseudonymous police officer’s challenge to termination of employment); Santa Fe
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (pseudonymous students’ challenge to
public high school’s “football prayer policy”); Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305 (1988)
(pseudonymous student’s challenge to district’s policy of excluding disabled children
from classroom for dangerous or disruptive conduct); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202
(1982) (pseudonymous children’s challenge to exclusion of illegal aliens from public
schools); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (pseudonymous woman’s challenge to
criminal abortion statute).
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mentioned the plaintiff’s anonymity with a subtext of approval.197
Although the Supreme Court has had occasion to rule on the
propriety of, and standards for, the use of pseudonyms by plaintiffs,
it has to date declined to do so.198
The First, Third, Eighth, D.C., and Federal Circuits199 do not
appear to have addressed the issue of plaintiff anonymity at all.200
When analyzing whether to permit a plaintiff to proceed
pseudonymously, the Fourth Circuit continues to rely on the fivefactor test articulated in James v. Jacobson in 1993,201 while the

197. See, e.g., Santa Fe Independent Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 294 (2000)
(noting with evident approval that the district court “permitted respondents (Does)
to litigate anonymously to protect them from intimidation or harassment”); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 124 (1973) (“Despite the use of the pseudonym, no suggestion is
made that Roe is a fictitious person.”).
198. See Doe v. Megless, 132 S. Ct. 1543 (2012) (denying petition for a writ of
certiorari), petition for cert. filed, 2011 WL 5909906 (U.S. Nov. 22, 2011) (No. 11-643)
(stating the question as “[w]hether this Court should provide much-needed guidance
to lower courts by announcing specific factors that must be given special weight
when a party wishes to litigate using a fictitious name?”); see also Doe v.
Kamehameha Schools, 563 U.S. 988 (2011) (denying petition for writ of certiorari).
199. See Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 506 (M.D. Pa. 2007)
(“[t]he Third Circuit of Appeals has not articulated a standard to weight litigants’
efforts to proceed anonymously”); Qualls v. Rumsfeld, 228 F.R.D. 8, (D.D.C. 2005)
(“Whether a Judge may ever set aside the straightforward language of Federal Rule
10(a) and Local Civil Rules 5(e)(1) and 11.1 to allow parties to proceed under
pseudonyms remains an open question in this circuit”).
200. In one of the few cases since 2004 involving plaintiff pseudonymity in a
district court within the First Circuit, the plaintiff had ingested a prescription drug
that she claimed caused her to suffer a severe manic episode that resulted in her
involuntary admission to a mental institution. Doe v. Solvay Pharmaceuticals, 350 F.
Supp. 2d 257 (D. Me. 2004). The plaintiff filed a motion under seal to file
pseudonymously. Id. The district court found it understandable that the plaintiff
considered the information in this lawsuit “highly confidential, private and sensitive
and does not wish the information as to her identity to be available to the public.” Id.
at 274 n. 1. The district court even recited the facts in the case in such a way to avoid
breaching the plaintiff’s privacy while providing an explanation for its decision to
grant summary judgment in favor of the defendant pharmaceutical company. Id. at
257.
201. See, e.g., James v. Jacobson, 6 F.3d 233, 238–39 (4th Cir. 1993). In James,
the Fourth Circuit held that district courts should consider the following when
determining if a plaintiff will be granted the “rare dispensation” of proceeding
anonymously: (1) whether the justification asserted by the requesting party is merely
to avoid the annoyance and criticism that may attend any litigation or is to preserve
privacy in a matter of sensitive and highly personally nature; (2) whether
identification poses a risk of retaliatory physical or mental harm to the requesting
party or even more critically, to innocent non-parties; (3) the ages of the persons
whose privacy interests are sought to be protected; (4) whether the action is against
a governmental or private party; and, relatedly, (5) the risk of unfairness to the
opposing party from allowing an action against it to proceed anonymously. Id.
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anonymous plaintiffs standards set forth in 1981 in Doe v. Stegall
remain in place in the Fifth Circuit.202 In evaluating the plaintiff’s
request to proceed anonymously in Citizens for a Strong Ohio v.
Marsh, the Sixth Circuit in 2005 relied on the four-part test
enunciated the year before in Doe v. Porter.203 Also in 2005 the
Seventh Circuit, in Doe v. Elmbrook School District, relied on
guidance regarding this issue set forth in 2004’s Doe v. City of
Chicago.204 When evaluating potential anonymous plaintiffs, the
Ninth Circuit continues to adhere to the standards set forth in 2000
in Does I Thru XXII v. Advanced Textile Corp.205 The Tenth Circuit
follows a three-factor test from 2000.206
Furthermore, there is no indication that these circuit court
standards are routinely followed by lower federal courts. Indeed,
various lower federal courts have devised and examined a myriad of
factors in determining whether to permit a plaintiff to proceed
pseudonymously.207 As one federal court diplomatically put it, “[a]

202. See Doe v. Stegall, 653 F.2d 180, 186 (5th Cir. 1981).
203. Citizens for a Strong Ohio v. Marsh, 123 Fed. App’x 630, 636 (6th Cir. 2005)
(“When determining whether such an exception is justified, a court may consider,
among others, the following factors: (1) whether the plaintiffs seeking anonymity are
suing to challenge governmental activity; (2) whether prosecution of the suit will
compel the plaintiffs to disclose information of the utmost intimacy; (3) whether the
litigation compels plaintiffs to disclose an intention to violate the law, thereby
risking criminal prosecution; and (4) whether the plaintiffs are children. It is also
relevant to consider whether the defendants are being forced to proceed with
insufficient information to present their arguments against the plaintiff's case”)
(citing Doe v. Porter, 370 F.3d 558, 560–61 (6th Cir. 2004)).
204. Doe 3 v. Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 658 F.3d 710, 721–22 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[t]he
presumption that parties’ identities are public information, and the possible
prejudice to the opposing party from concealment, can be rebutted by showing that
the harm to the [party requesting anonymity] . . . exceeds the likely harm from
concealment”) (citing Doe v. City of Chicago, 360 F.3d 667, 669 (7th Cir. 2004)).
205. See Doe v. Ayers, 789 F.3d 944, 945 (9th Cir. 2015) (in determining whether
to allow pseudonymity, “the Court must balance the following factors: (1) the severity
of the threatened harm, (2) the reasonableness of the anonymous party's fears, (3)
the anonymous party's vulnerability to such retaliation”) (citing Does I Thru XXIII v.
Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d 1058, 1068 (9th Cir. 2000)).
206. See, e.g., Raiser v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 182 Fed.
App’x. 810, 811 (10th Cir. 2006) (“[I]n certain ‘exceptional circumstances’ the need for
anonymity
outweighs
the
presumption
in
favor
of
open
court
proceedings. Exceptional circumstances exist if the case involves matters of a highly
sensitive and personal nature, real danger of physical harm, or where the injury
litigated against would be incurred as a result of the disclosure of [] identity.”) (citing
Femedeer v. Haun, 227 F.3d 1244, 1246 (10th Cir. 2000) (quotations omitted)).
207. These factors include, inter alia, (1) whether the litigation involves matters
that are highly sensitive and of a personal nature or involve the utmost intimacy; (2)
whether plaintiff identification poses a risk of retaliatory physical or mental harm to
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review of the case law indicates that courts which have addressed
this issue have formulated various standards, albeit dissimilar . . . to
determine whether a party should be permitted to proceed in
pseudonym.”208
In addition to the lack of uniformity of these standards, there is
a lack of predictability and consistency in their application, if at all,
within the same circuit. For example, in 2010, a plaintiff in the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania moved to sue anonymously various
public officials and local government entities for disseminating email
and flyers that allegedly characterized him as dangerous and
potentially mentally unstable.209 The District Court noted that the
Third Circuit “has not addressed the standard for granting
anonymity.”210 Thus the court examined nine factors, primarily from
prior Eastern District of Pennsylvania cases, in deciding whether to
permit the plaintiff to proceed anonymously.211 In denying the
plaintiff or to innocent non-parties; (3) whether the injury litigated against would be
incurred as a result of the disclosure of the plaintiff's identity; (4) whether the
plaintiff is particularly vulnerable to the possible harms of disclosure, particularly in
light of her age; (5) whether the suit is challenging the actions of the government; (6)
whether the defendant would be prejudiced by allowing the plaintiff to proceed
anonymously; (7) whether the plaintiff's identity has thus far been kept confidential;
(8) whether the public's interest in the litigation is furthered by requiring the
plaintiff to disclose her identity; (9) whether, because of the purely legal nature of
the issues presented or otherwise, there is an atypically weak public interest in
knowing the plaintiff’s identity; (10) whether there are any alternative mechanisms
for protecting the confidentiality of the plaintiff; (11) whether the plaintiff will refuse
to pursue the case at the price of being publicly identified; (12) whether the plaintiff
risks prosecution for admitting to engage in illegal activity; (13) whether and to what
degree the plaintiff will suffer economic harm her identity is known. See Sealed
Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 185, 190 (2d Cir. 2008) (internal quotations
and citations omitted); see also Filing Pseudonymously Federal, WITHOUT
MYCONSENT.ORG,
http://withoutmyconsent.org/50state/filing-pseudonymously/
federal.
208. See generally Doe v. Provident Life & Acc. Ins., 176 F.R.D. 464, 466 (E.D.
Pa. 1997).
209. See generally Doe v. Megless, 654 F.3d 404 (3d Cir. 2011).
210. See generally Doe v. Megless, No. 10–1008, 2010 WL 3076246, at *2 n. 1
(E.D. Pa. Aug. 5, 2010).
211. Id. (“A district court considers a number of non-exclusive factors when
deciding whether to grant a party anonymity. Factors in favor of anonymity include:
(1) the extent litigant has kept his identity confidential; (2) the reason for anonymity;
(3) if there is public interest in favor of anonymity; (4) if the case is fact sensitive or
purely of a legal nature; (5) whether the litigant will pursue his claim if he cannot
proceed anonymously; and (6) if the party opposing anonymity has illegitimate
ulterior motives. Factors against anonymity include: (1) the general level of public
interest in the case; (2) if there is a higher level of public interest in the trial because
of the subject matter involved or the public status of a litigant; and (3) if the party
seeking anonymity has an ulterior motive.”) (internal citations omitted).
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plaintiff’s motion, the court concluded that “[a]fter weighing the
factors, . . . [the p]laintiff has not proven his private interest in
anonymity outweighs the public’s interest in open judicial
proceeding.”212
On appeal, the Third Circuit explained that “[w]hile we have
affirmed district courts’ decisions on motions to proceed
anonymously, we have never set out a test for courts to apply . . . .
Courts within our circuit have been balancing . . . competing
interests for the last fifteen years without our guidance.”213 Noting
that the district courts within the circuit had primarily applied the
test set forth by the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in Doe v.
Provident Life,214 the Court then formally endorsed it.215 After
analyzing each factor, the Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s
denial of the plaintiff’s motion to proceed pseudonymously.216
Three years later, a plaintiff sued the New Jersey Department of
Corrections in the District of New Jersey, alleging mistreatment at
the hands of various correctional officers and inmates.217 The opinion
addressing the substance of the plaintiff’s complaint starts simply
with the phrase “Plaintiff, Chris Doe,” followed by a footnote that
states, “[i]n the caption and his Complaint, Plaintiff is referred to by
the fictional name of Chris Doe.”218 Despite the Third Circuit’s
official endorsement of Provident’s nine-factor test to be used in
determining whether a plaintiff may proceed under a pseudonym,
the District of New Jersey permitted the case to go forward with the
fictional name of the plaintiff as “Chris Doe,” simply ignoring the
Third Circuit’s test.
Likewise, in 2008, the Second Circuit “set forth the standard
governing the use of pseudonyms in civil litigation in our
Circuit”219—what was then an issue of first impression for that
Court.220 The Second Circuit adopted the Ninth’s Circuit’s balancing
test, weighing the plaintiff’s need for anonymity against both the
prejudice to the opposing party and the public’s interest in knowing

212. Id. at *5.
213. Doe v. Megless, 654 F.3d 404, 408–09 (3d Cir. 2011).
214. Doe v. Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 176 F.R.D. 464 (E.D. Pa. 1997).
215. Doe v. Megless, 654 F.3d 404, 410 (3d Cir. 2011).
216. Id. at 411.
217. Doe v. New Jersey Dep’t of Corr., No. CIV.A. 14-5284 FLW, 2015 WL
3448233, at *1 (D.N.J. May 29, 2015).
218. Id.
219. Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 185, 189 (2d Cir. 2008).
220. Id. at 188.
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the party’s identity.221 In so doing, the Court “noted with approval”
ten enumerated factors “identified by our sister Circuits and the
district courts in this Circuit,” while cautioning that the list is not
exclusive.222 The Second Circuit vacated the lower court’s decision in
that particular case, as the lower court “did not apply the correct
legal standard to determine whether plaintiff’s application to
proceed under a pseudonym” since it “did not balance plaintiff’s
interest in proceeding anonymously against the interests of
defendants and the public.”223 The Second Circuit instructed that “a
district court is not required to list each of the factors or use any
particular formulation as long as it is clear that the court balanced
the interests at stake in reaching its conclusion.”224 Notwithstanding
the Second Circuit’s mandate, district courts in the Eastern and
Southern Districts of New York, as well as the District of
Connecticut,
recently
permitted
plaintiffs
to
proceed
pseudonymously without even addressing the issue.225
In addition to varied and inconsistent evaluative standards, the
procedures regarding the process by which a plaintiff can proceed
pseudonymously are ad hoc, at best. In the Ninth Circuit, for
example, a plaintiff may file a suit under a pseudonym, and then file
a cross-motion for leave to proceed under that pseudonym in
response to a motion to dismiss.226 In the District of Columbia
Circuit, rightsholders may ask the Chief Judge, ex parte, for leave to
file a complaint omitting the plaintiff’s real name and full address.227
Leave is generally granted if the rightsholder makes a colorable
argument in support of the request.228 If the Chief Judge grants
leave to file, the plaintiff may then file a pseudonymous complaint,
and the case will be assigned to a judge just like any ordinary

221. Id. at 189.
222. Id. at 189–90.
223. Id. at 191.
224. Id. at 193 n. 4 (emphasis added).
225. See e.g., Doe v. Torrington Bd. of Educ., No. 3:15-cv-00452, 2016 WL
1257819 (D. Conn. Mar. 30, 2016); Doe v. New York, 97 F. Supp. 3d 5 (E.D.N.Y.
2015); Doe v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 129 F. Supp. 3d 23 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); Doe v. Deer
Mountain Day Camp, Inc., 682 F. Supp. 2d 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
226. Doe v. Amazon.com, Inc., NO. C11-1709MJP, 2011 WL 13073281 (W.D.
Wash. Dec. 23, 2011).
227. See e.g., id.; Qualls v. Rumsfeld, 228 F.R.D. 8 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“[w]hether a
Judge may ever set aside the straightforward language of Federal Rule 10(a) and
Local Civil Rules 5(e)(1) and 11.1 to allow parties to proceed under pseudonyms
remains an open question in this circuit”).
228. Qualls, 228 F.R.D. at 10.
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case.229 The Chief Judge’s leave to file is given only “at this time”
and does not guarantee that a plaintiff may proceed pseudonymously
throughout the case; rather, the leave is an indication that the
plaintiff’s request is not frivolous and gets the case moving quickly,
leaving the issue open to full, adverse litigation at a later date.230
2. State Cases
State case law concerning pseudonymous plaintiffs is
wide-ranging. Many state courts defer for guidance on this matter to
federal
courts.231
Others
permit
plaintiffs
to
proceed
pseudonymously without addressing the issue,232 or by simply noting
that the plaintiff is using a pseudonym.233 Courts in certain states,
such as California, explicitly permit the use of pseudonyms, with one
even acknowledging the danger that the internet poses to certain
plaintiffs.234 When state courts deny a plaintiff’s request to proceed
using a pseudonym, they often cite the need for “open judicial
proceedings.”235

229. Id.
230. Id.; see generally Doe v. District of Columbia, 216 F.R.D. 5, 6 n.1 (D.D.C.
2003) (“Plaintiffs are proceeding pseudonymously, per order of the court, Chief Judge
Hogan”); Oah v. Tabor, No. 90-1023, 1991 WL 120087, at *1 n. 1 (D.D.C. June 18,
1991).
231. See e.g., Doe v. Weiss, 2010 Ark. LEXIS 176, *3–5 (2010); Unwitting Victim
v. C.S., 47 P.3d 392, 400–01 (Kan. 2002); Doe v. Burkland, 808 A.2d 1090, 1096–97
(R.I. 2002); Doe v. Bruner, No. CA2011–07–013, 2012 WL 626202 (Ohio Ct. App.
2012); Doe v. Town of Plainfield, 860 N.E.2d 1204, 1208–09 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007); Doe
v. Heitler, 26 P.3d 539, 541–42 (Colo. App. 2001); Doe v. Shady Grove Adventist
Hosp., 598 A.2d 507, 513–14 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991); Doe v. Bodwin, 326 N.W.2d
473, 475 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982); Roe v. Gen. Hosp. Corp., No. CIV.A. 11-991-BLS1,
2011 WL 2342737, at *1 (Mass. Super. May 19, 2011).
232. See e.g., Doe v. Haw, No. CV OC 0205441D, 2003 WL 21015134 (Idaho Feb.
3, 2003); Doe v. Mo. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 280 S.W.3d 110) (Mo. Ct. App. 2009); Doe v.
Medford Sch. Dist., 221 P.3d 787 (Or. Ct. App. 2009); Doe v. Walsh, 2007 WL
2734289, Civil Action No. 07– 2052A (Mass. Super. Sept. 20, 2007).
233. See e.g., Doe v. Arkansas Dept. of Human Services, 182 S.W.3d 107, 108
(Ark. 2004) (“Jane Doe and Jane Roe are pseudonyms”); Doe v. Wyo. Valley Heath
Care Sys., Inc., 987 A.2d 758, 761 n. 1 (Pa. Super Ct. 2009) (“Appellee uses the
pseudonym ‘Jane Doe’ to protect her identity”); Doe v. Arpaio, 150 P.3d 1258, 1259
n.1 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007) (“[t]he trial court allowed plaintiff Jane Doe to proceed
pseudonymously. We continue that usage”).
234. See Starbucks Corp. v. Superior Court, 86 Cal. Rprtr. 3d 482, 495 n.7 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2008) (“The judicial use of ‘Doe plaintiffs’ to protect legitimate privacy rights
has gained wide currency, particularly given the rapidity and ubiquity of disclosures
over the World Wide Web”).
235. See infra Part III B.; see also, e.g., A.A. v. Gramiccioni, 122 A.3d 353, 357–
58 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2015) (“Absent a statute or court rule mandating
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Even in states where a statute provides for broader plaintiff
anonymity than the four usual categories (minors, sexual abuse,
domestic relations, or sensitive medical issues),236 there is typically a
dearth of cases in which courts have directly addressed the issue.
For example, although the Illinois legislature passed 735 ILCS 5/2401(e) in 1987, which permits the parties to sue under a pseudonym
for “good cause,”237 an appellate court in that state recently noted
that “[t]here are very few Illinois cases addressing the question of
good cause under section 2–401(e).”238
Like the federal courts, many states are inconsistent and ad hoc
with their practices concerning pseudonymous plaintiffs. For
example, in Connecticut, the Superior Court recently permitted
plaintiffs in two cases involving sexual abuse to proceed
anonymously,239 while in another similar sexual abuse case the same
court denied the plaintiff’s request to use a pseudonym.240

anonymity in court proceedings, a litigant must show good cause to proceed
anonymously or by pseudonym . . . Once the litigant shows such compelling
circumstances, the court must weigh the litigant's privacy interest against
constitutional and public interest in open judicial proceedings”); Doe v. Archdiocese
of Atlanta, 761 S.E.2d 864, 869–70 (Ga. App. 2014) (“a trial court may, in
extraordinary cases, [permit a plaintiff to proceed using a pseudonym]. In so doing,
the ultimate test is whether the plaintiff has a “substantial privacy right which
outweighs the customary and constitutionally-embedded presumption of openness in
judicial proceedings.”) (citing Doe v. Frank, 951 F.2d 320, 323 (11th Cir. 1992));
Bransten v. State, 969 N.Y.S.2d 402, 414–15 (Sup. Ct. 2013), aff'd, 985 N.Y.S.2d 60
(2014) (“[T]he ‘use of a pseudonym must be reserved for cases in which the matter
alleged implicates a privacy right so substantial as to outweigh the customary and
constitutionally embedded presumption of openness in judicial proceedings’”) (citing
McKinney's CPLR § 1024, Practice Commentaries, by Vincent C. Alexander) (citing
“J. Doe No. 1” v. CBS Broadcasting Inc., 24 A.D.3d 215 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005)).
236. See supra Part II B.
237. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-401 (2016).
238. Doe v. Nw. Mem'l Hosp., 19 N.E.3d 178, 192 (Ill. App. 2014); see also Doe v.
Town of Plainfield, 860 N.E.2d 1204, 1206–07 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (“Although
anonyms have appeared in Indiana state cases, there is no reported Indiana decision
where the use of an anonym has been challenged. Hence, we have no specific criteria
to apply”).
239. See Doe v. Firn, No. CV065001087S, 2006 WL 2847885, at *1 (Conn. Super.
Ct. Sept. 22, 2006); Doe v. Curtis, No. CV095028697, 2010 WL 936781, at *1 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Feb. 10, 2010).
240. Doe v. St. John, No. CV055000443S, 2006 WL 1149224 (Conn. Super. Ct.
Apr. 13, 2006). Compare Doe v. Martin, No. CV044001231, 2004 WL 2669274, at *1
(Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 1, 2004) (denying adult victim of sexual abuse the right to sue
pseudonymously), with Doe v. McNamara, No. CV095022796S, 2009 WL 1334992, at
*1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 20, 2009) (permitting adult victim of sexual abuse the right
to sue pseudonymously).
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III. IMPEDIMENTS TO THE USE OF PSEUDONYMOUS PLAINTIFFS
A. Legislators’ and the Judiciary’s Lack of Understanding of
Technology, the Internet, and Social Media.
Many lawmakers are not well-versed in the workings of
technology, the internet, and social media. Supreme Court Justice
Elena Kagan admitted that she and her fellow justices “have a way
to go” to understand technology such as Facebook, Twitter and even
email.241 She stated that “[t]he justices are not necessarily the most
technologically sophisticated people . . . [t]he court hasn’t really
‘gotten to’ email.”242 Justice Kagan revealed that “communication
among the justices is the same as when she clerked for the late
Thurgood Marshall in 1987: “Justice[s] write memos printed out on
paper that looks like it came from the 19th century . . . . The memos
are then walked around the building by someone called a ‘chambers
aide.’”243 In 2011 Justice Roberts stated that he did not have a
Facebook account, nor did any of his colleagues on the bench.244
Justice Breyer, however, did have a Twitter account, which he said
he did not know how to deactivate.245 Justice Breyer said “I wouldn’t
want followers on the Tweeter [sic].”246
While overseeing Roger Clemens’ trial in 2012, the United States
District of Columbia judge in the case told a juror “I’m an old guy. I
don’t know how Twitter works.”247 He then asked the juror to
explain it to him.248 In September, 2015, a state judge in

241. Michelle R. Smith, Justice Kagan Reveals That The Supreme Court Is
Totally Technologically Challenged, BUSINESSINSIDER.COM (Aug. 20, 2013, 6:43 PM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/justice-kagan-reveals-that-the-supreme-court-istotally-technologically-challenged-2013-8.
242. Id. Justice Kagan also stated that Facebook and Twitter “are a challenge
for us.” Will Oremus, Elena Kagan Admits Supreme Court Justices Haven’t Quite
Figured Out Email Yet, SLATE.COM (Aug. 20 2013, 3:33 PM), http://www.slate.com/
blogs/future_tense/2013/08/20/elena_kagan_supreme_court_justices_haven_t_gotten_
to_email_use_paper_memos.html.
243. Smith, supra, note 241.
244. Maryam K. Ansari, Justice Roberts Speaks at 4th Circuit Court of Appeals
Conference, FINDLAW: 4TH CIRCUIT NEWS & INFORMATION BLOG (Jun. 30, 2011),
http://blogs.findlaw.com/fourth_circuit/2011/06/justice-roberts-speaks-at-4th-circuitcourt-of-appeals-conference.html.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Richard Dunham, Clemens Judge: ‘I Don’t Know How Twitter Works’,
HOUSTON CHRONICLE: BLOG (Apr. 17, 2012), http://blog.chron.com/clemens/2012/04/
technologically-challenged-clemens-judge-asks-juror-how-twitter-works.
248. Id.
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Minneapolis caused a trial verdict to be vacated and a new trial
ordered when he posted on Facebook details about a trial over which
he was presiding.249 He wrote “I just love doing the stress of jury
trials . . . . In a Felony trial now State prosecuting pimp. Cases are
always difficult because the women (as in this case also) will not
cooperate. We will see what the 12 citizens in the jury box will do.”250
The Minnesota Board of Judicial Standards publicly reprimanded
the judge for the post.251 The judge explained that although he had
been on Facebook for two years, he was unaware of its privacy
settings and did not realize that his post could be read beyond his
friends and family.252
In 2009, Michigan Congressman Pete Hoekstra tweeted that he
“just landed in Bagdad,” information that was not supposed to be
public.253 In 2011, Ohio Congressman William Batchelder had his
twitter account hacked. In response, the Congressman stated “Well,
I won’t do any more of this … Twittering? We’ll avoid that at all cost.
I didn’t know I had such a device.”254 One legal blogger opined that
“[t]he biggest social medial issue is getting judges to understand
social media.”255
B. A Misplaced Understanding of Open Judicial Proceedings.
Courts have been reluctant to permit plaintiffs to sue under
pseudonyms, stating that to do so hampers the societal interest in
open judicial proceedings.256 They presume, often without
explanation, that pseudonymous plaintiffs and open judicial
proceedings are by definition mutually exclusive.257 These courts

249. Associated Press, Senior Judge Reprimanded by Judicial Board for Posting
about Cases on Facebook, STAR TRIBUNE (Nov. 20, 2015), http://www.startribune.
com/judge-reprimanded-for-facebook-posts-about-cases/352218191.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Faith Eischen, Politicians & Social Media: The Good, The Bad, The Ugly,
INDEPENDENT VOTER PROJECT (Jun. 29, 2012), http://ivn.us/2012/06/29/politicianssocial-media-the-good-the-bad-the-ugly.
254. Id.
255. The Biggest Social Media Legal Issue is Getting Judges to Understand
THOUGHTS
(May
8,
2012,
1:19
PM),
Social
Media,
SOMELAW
https://somelaw.wordpress.com/2012/05/08/the-biggest-social-media-legal-issue-isgetting-judges-to-understand-social-media.
256. See Isler, supra, note 195.
257. Id.
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also implicitly assume that open judicial proceedings are a per se
good, without exception or qualification.258
However, there appears to be no agreement on what constitutes
open judicial proceedings.259 Most courts have accepted, without
investigation, the notion that open judicial proceedings refers to a
prohibition against secrecy in the judicial process. The United States
Supreme Court has noted that “[t]he operations of the courts and the
judicial conduct of judges are matters of utmost public concern.”260
That Court opined that open court proceedings assure that
proceedings are conducted fairly and discourage perjury, misconduct
by participants, and biased decision making.261 The Court
proclaimed that openness promotes public understanding,
confidence, and acceptance of judicial processes and results, while
secrecy encourages misunderstanding, distrust, and disrespect for
the courts.262 The importance of openness in judicial proceedings can
be seen in several state constitutions, which include specific
reference to such access.263 Opponents of plaintiff pseudonymity
argue that the practice contravenes the importance of open judicial
proceedings.264
Although many state constitutions include a provision that “all
courts shall be open,”265 much research on this provision indicates

258. Id.
259. “[With respect to] the open courts clause[,] [t]he courts are in total disarray
over how to interpret it.” Jonathan M. Hoffman, By the Course of the Law: The
Origins of the Open Courts Clause of State Constitutions, 74 OR. L. REV. 1279, 1282
(1995); see generally Thomas R. Phillips, The Constitutional Right to A Remedy, 78
N.Y.U.L. REV. 1309 (2003).
260. Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 839 (1978).
261. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 569 (1980).
262. Id. at 569–70.
263. See e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 11 (“[j]ustice in all cases shall be
administered openly”); CAL. CONST. art. I, § 3 (“the meetings of public bodies . . .
shall be open to public scrutiny”); OR. CONST. art. I, § 10 (“[n]o court shall be secret,
but justice shall be administered, openly and without purchase”); WASH. CONST. art.
I, § 10 (“[j]ustice in all cases shall be administered openly, and without unnecessary
delay”). For a comprehensive list of state constitutions’ open courts clauses, see
Judicial Administration State Link, NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS,
http://www.ncsc.org/Topics/Judicial-Officers/Judicial-Administration/State-Links.asp
x?cat=Constitutional%20Access%20to%20Justice%20Provisions
(last
visited
September 2, 2017).
264. Research turned up nothing that provides that “open” mandates full
disclosure of a party’s full name.
265. See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 13; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 6; CONN. CONST. art. I, §
10; DEL. CONST. art. I, § 9; KY. CONST. § 14; LA. CONST. art. 1, § 22; MISS. CONST. art.
III, § 24,; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 13; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 15; PA. CONST. art. I, 11;
S.C. CONST. art. I, § 9; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 19; TEX. CONST, art. I, § 13; UTAH
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that it is tied to the concept of “a right to a remedy,” not public
access to courtrooms.266 Furthermore, “courts have never
undertaken the task of discovering from where the provision came,
or attempted to discern its original intent.”267 Some scholars go so
far as to opine that this language was added as a carryover from
language contained in the Magna Carta, without any real intent and
purpose.268
One scholar has surmised that “[t]he provision’s key phrases,
promoting openness in judicial proceedings and ensuring every
person ‘remedy by due course of law,’ disclose its true meaning as a
guarantee of freedom of the judiciary from corrupt influence and
improper meddling.”269 He opined that “[b]elieving in the necessity of
an independent judiciary, the earliest state constitutions
incorporated this provision to ensure that justice would not be
compromised as it had been in the past.”270 Another scholar
concluded that:
the early purpose of the open courts provision was to ensure
that all persons would have access to justice through the
courts. . . . [T]he various states’ interpretations of the
provision are inconsistent and . . . the jurisprudential
significance of the provision varies dramatically from state to
state. In some states, it is second only to the due process
clause in importance; while in other states, it is little more
than an interesting historical relic.271

COSNT. art. I, § 11; VT. CONST. ch. 1, art. 4; WYO. CONST. art. 1, § 8, all available at
http://www.ncsc.org/Topics/Judicial-Officers/Judicial-Administration/StateLinks.aspx?cat=Constitutional%20Access%20to%20Justice%20Provisions.
266. See, e.g., Jonathan M. Hoffman, Questions Before Answers: The Ongoing
Search to Understand the Origins of the Open Courts Clause, 32 RUTGERS U. L. REV.
1005, 1006 n.5 (2001); William C. Koch, Jr., Reopening Tennessee's Open Courts
Clause: A Historical Reconsideration of Article I, Section 17 of the Tennessee
Constitution, 27 U. MEM. L. REV. 333, 419 (1997); David Schuman, Oregon's Remedy
Guarantee: Article I, Section 10 of the Oregon Constitution, 65 OR. L. REV. 35, 42
(1986).
267. Hoffman, supra note 259, at 1282.
268. See Hoffman, supra note 259, at 1284; Hoffman, supra note 266, at 1006;
Schuman, supra note 266, at 39.
269. Hoffman, supra note 259, at 1288.
270. Id. at 1318.
271. Koch, Jr., supra note 266, at 341.
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Thus, a fair interpretation of the clause is that it does not refer
to third parties’ rights to enter the courtroom.272 For example,
although article I, § 13 of the Texas Constitution states that “[a]ll
courts shall be open,”273 the Supreme Court of Texas has noted that
that section
“includes at least three separate constitutional
guarantees: (1) courts must actually be operating and available; (2)
the Legislature cannot impede access to the courts through
unreasonable financial barriers; and (3) meaningful remedies must
be afforded.”274 Yet another theory is that the clause is one that
refers to the right to a remedy.275

272. See e.g., State v. Porter Superior Court, 412 N.E.2d 748, 751 (Ind. 1980);
Dodd v. Reese, 24 N.E.2d 995 (Ind. 1940); (“[T]he requirement of Art. I, § 12, that the
courts be open may refer to being open to the injured for legal redress . . . , and not to
openness in the sense of being open to observation by the public and press.”) (citing
Gallup v. Schmidt, 56 N.E. 443 (Ind. 1900)); Goodrum v. Asplundth Tree Expert Co.,
824 S.W.2d 6, 9 (Mo. 1992) (‘“Art. I §14 does not create rights, but is meant to protect
the enforcement of rights already acknowledged by law. The right of access means
simply the right to pursue in the courts the causes of action substantive law
recognizes.’”) (quoting Mahoney v. Doerhoff Surgical Services, Inc., 807 S.W.2d 503,
510 (Mo. 1991)); Meech v. Hillhaven W., Inc., 776 P. 2d 488 (Mont. 1989) (“[Article of
Constitution governing access to court and guaranteeing remedy] guarantees only
right of access to courts to seek remedy recognized by common-law or statutory
authority”); Mehdipour v. Wise, 65 P.3d 271, 275 (Okla. 2003) (“It is always
important to recognize that the right to reasonable access to the courts is not the
same thing as having a right to appear personally in court to participate in a lawsuit
which has been filed there.”); Kyllo v. Panzer, 535 N.W.2d 896, 901 (S.D. 2012) (“[We
have] interpreted the open courts provision as a guarantee that for such wrongs as
are recognized by the laws of the land the courts shall be open and afford a remedy.”)
(quoting Simons v. Kidd, 38 N.W.2d 883, 886 (S.D. 1949)) (internal citations
omitted); Puttuck v. Gendron, 199 P.3d 971, 978 (Utah App. 2008) (“[T]he open
courts provision was intended to place ‘a limitation upon the [l]egislature to prevent
that branch of the state government from closing the doors of the courts against any
person who has a legal right which is enforceable in accordance with some known
remedy.’”) (quoting Brown v. Wightman, 151 P. 366, 366-67 (Utah 1915)); see also
Louis F. Hubener, Rights of Privacy in Open Courts – Do They Exist? 2 EMERGING
ISSUES ST. Const. L. 189, 192 (1989) (“These provisions originated, however, as
guarantees of legal remedies, not to ensure that courts would be open for
spectators”). But see KFGO Radio Inc., v. Rothe, 298 N.W.2d. 505, 511 (N.D. 1980)
(“[T]he provision in Article I, §22 of the Constitution of North Dakota which states
that ‘all courts shall be open’ stands for the proposition that officers of the courts,
along with jurors, witnesses, litigants, and the general public have the right of
admission to court proceedings.”).
273. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13.
274. Trinity River Auth. v. URS Consultants, 889 S.W.2d 259, 261 (Tex. 1994)
(citing Tex. Ass’n of Business v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 448 (Tex.
1993).
275. See Schuman, supra note 266, at 35–36.
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Given the uncertainty regarding the meaning of the open court
ideal, and the Supreme Court’s implicit acceptance of the practice of
pseudonymous plaintiffs, my assertion is straightforward: the notion
of open courts should not be an impediment to the use of
pseudonyms by certain rightsholders. Using a pseudonym does not
impact societal access to the workings of the judiciary. The public
does not know the identity of most plaintiffs in class action lawsuits,
yet these cases have provided invaluable information regarding
various legal issues. Indeed, in the overwhelming number of cases it
is not the plaintiff’s name that is relevant to the public,276 but rather
the specifics about the cause of action. I suggest that in most cases
there is no material difference to the public if the plaintiff is
revealed to be Bob and not John. The important public aspect of
most cases concerns the issues involved, not the specific party
raising the issues. “Case law indicates that any risk . . . of allowing a
plaintiff to proceed anonymously is minimized when the ‘issues
raised are purely legal and do not depend on identifying the specific
parties.’”277 The public has little legitimate interest in knowing the
identity of a party suing it if that party’s identity has little or no
bearing on the case itself.278 Indeed, one court noted that “[i]f a
plaintiff is granted leave to proceed using a fictitious name, the
public is not denied its right to attend the proceedings or inspect the
orders or opinions of the court on the underlying constitutional
issue.”279

276. The plaintiff’s identity, however, might be particularly important to the
defendant. I propose a solution to this dichotomy of interests in my
recommendations, Part IV infra.
277. Doe 1 v. Merten, 219 F.R.D. 387, 394 n. 22 (E.D. Va. 2004) (citing Doe v.
Alaska, No. 96-35873, 1997 WL 547941, at *1 (9th Cir. 1997)); see also Doe v.
Pittsylvania Cty., 844 F. Supp. 2d 724, 731 (W.D. Va. 2012). But see Doe v.
Spearmint Rhino, No. CV 08-4038 ABC, 2009 WL 250054, *3 (C.D. Cal. 2009)
(‘Identifying the parties to the proceeding is an important dimension of publicness.
The people have a right to know who is using their courts.”) (citing United States v.
Stoterau, 524 F.3d 988, 1012 (9th Cir. 2008)).
278. See, e.g., Freedom From Religion Found. v. New Kensington-Arnold Sch.
Dist., No. 2:12-cv-1319, 2012 WL 6629643, *3 (W.D. Pa. 2012) (stating in a case in
which the plaintiffs sought a declaration that a monument of the Ten
Commandments at the local high school was unconstitutional that “the issue in this
case does not turn on the identity of the [p]laintiffs”).
279. Doe v. Pittsylvania Cty., 844 F. Supp. 2d 724, 728 (citing Doe v. Barrow Co.,
219 F.R.D. 189, 193 (N.D. Ga. 2003)).
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C. A Misplaced Aversion to the Concept of Anonymity.
Those who eschew the concept of anonymity need only be
reminded of its importance in United States legal history. “Between
1789 and 1809, six presidents, fifteen cabinet members, twenty
senators, and thirty-four congressmen published anonymous
political writings or used pen names.”280 The Federalist Papers and
their rebuttal were authored under a pseudonym.281 In 1995, the
Supreme Court recognized that “[a]nonymity is a shield from the
tyranny of the majority. . . . It thus exemplifies the purpose behind
the Bill of Rights and of the First Amendment in particular: to
protect unpopular individuals from retaliation . . . at the hand of an
intolerant society.”282 Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that
anonymous speech is afforded the same Constitutional first
amendment rights as speech of which the author is known.283
Applying to postings on the internet the Supreme Court’s support of
the role that anonymity plays in protecting one’s rights, the Ninth
Circuit stated, “[a]s with other forms of expression, the ability to
speak anonymously on the Internet promotes the robust exchange of
ideas and allows individuals to express themselves freely without
‘fear of economic or official retaliation . . . [or] concern about social
ostracism.’”284 Several district courts have observed that “[t]he free
exchange of ideas on the Internet is driven in large part by the
ability of Internet users to communicate anonymously.”285 State
courts have also highlighted the importance of anonymous internet
speech.286

280. SOLOVE, supra note 24, at 139–40.
281. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 343 n.6 (1995);
Primary Documents in American History: The Federalist Papers, WEB GUIDES,
https://www.loc.gov/rr/program/bib/ourdocs/federalist.html (last visited Sept. 3,
2017).
282. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 343.
283. Id.
284. In re Anonymous Online Speakers, 661 F.3d 1168, 1173 (9th Cir. 2011)
(quoting McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 348).
285. In re Rule 45 Subpoena Issued to Cablevision Sys. Corp. Regarding IP
Address 69.120.35.31, No. 08MC347 ARR MDG, 2010 WL 1686811, at *2 (E.D.N.Y.
2010) (quoting Doe v. 2TheMart.Com Inc. 140 F.Supp. 2d 1088, 1093 (W.D. Wash.
2001)).
286. See, e.g., Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005); Klehr Harrison Harvey
Branzburg & Ellers, LLP v. JPA Dev., Inc., No. 0425 MARCH TERM 2004, 2006 WL
37020, at *3 (Pa. C. P. 2006).
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D. Ignorance of the Costs of Denying Certain Plaintiffs the Right to
Proceed Using a Pseudonym.
1. Lack of Participation in the Judicial Process
Danielle Citron has contended that cyber harassment can raise
the price too high for vulnerable groups to remain online.287 These
costs can include, inter alia, physical threats, employmentinterfering posts, and invasion of privacy.288 The result, according to
Citron, is that vulnerable people are forced offline, “preventing them
from enjoying the economic and social opportunities that social
networking sites, blogs, . . . and other platforms provide.”289 Citron
opined that silencing these bloggers impoverishes societal dialogue
as a whole.290 She warned that cyber harassment “depriv[es]
vulnerable individuals of their equal right to participate in social,
economic, and political life.”291
A recent example of Citron’s assertion involves Chelsea Cain, the
author of a female heroine based comic series for Marvel. Cain quit
Twitter after receiving a surge of misogynistic tweets. She stated, “I
left Twitter because of the ordinary daily abuse that I decided I
didn’t want to live with anymore. . . . That’s the power we have,
right? . . . If a stranger yells at you on the street? You walk away.”292
In contrast, “walking away” from bringing a lawsuit as a result
of being denied the ability to do so pseudonymously results in a loss
of power both to vulnerable rightsholders and to the public. On a
foundational level, some rightsholders will lose their access to justice
due to their determination that the cost of participation in the
system—the risk and ramifications of public shaming—is too high.
This is a harm even if their claims are not meritorious because these
rightsholders will feel disenfranchised from the judicial process.
Other rightsholders dissuaded from bringing their lawsuits will lose
the opportunity to receive a settlement or litigated-for judgment.
The public loses as well when certain rightsholders do not proceed
with their actions. Societal faith in the judicial system can be lost

287. Citron, supra note 141, at 68–69.
288. Id. at 69.
289. Id. at 68–69.
290. Id. at 85.
291. Id. at 89.
292. Ryan Grenoble, Feminist Comic Book Author Quits Twitter Amid Storm Of
Abusive Tweets, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 28, 2016, 03:12 PM), http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/entry/chelsea-cain-mockingbird-feminist-comics-twitter_us_
58136044e4b0990edc307fc1 [https://perma.cc/V8LA-HLMJ].
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because potential defendants will continue to act improperly since
the threat of a lawsuit, normally a deterrent to bad behavior, will be
absent.
2. Loss Of Valuable Precedent
In instances where rightsholders choose to refain from
commencing litigation rather than risk being publicly shamed,
valuable precedent is potentially lost. Take, for example, the
shootings at Sandy Hook Elementary. As I noted earlier, a lawyer
sued the Connecticut Department of Education on behalf of a firstgrader who suffered emotional trauma as a result of the incident.293
However, because of harsh backlash on social media, he was forced
to withdraw the case.294 The public shaming in that case resulted in
a loss of what could have been invaluable precedent—precedent that
could have changed the legal landscape involving school shootings.
In other words, had the lawsuit gone forward, we might have had a
better understanding of the legal issues regarding school safety and
gun violence in Connecticut.
In similar litigation that did go forward, valuable precedent was
created. Several families of those injured and killed in the
Columbine school shooting sued the gunmen’s parents and those
who supplied the teens with the weapons they used to commit the
massacre.295 Although the lawsuits settled before verdict, the
amounts are indicative of the role the court considers parental and
third-party responsibility plays in such tragedies.296 In the wake of
the killings at Virginia Tech, parents of two of the deceased students
sued the University, alleging that the University was negligent for
failing to warn students of the presence of a gunman on campus.297

293. See discussion supra Part I.B.
294. Id.
295. Michael Janofsky, $2.53 Million Deal Ends Some Columbine Lawsuits, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 20, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/04/20/us/2.53-million-deal-endssome-columbine-lawsuits.html.
296. Id. Much legal scholarship has focused on the lack of precedential value
when a lawsuit results in settlement. See, e.g., Owen Fiss &Leandra Lederman,
Precedent Lost: Why Encourage Settlement, and Why Permit Non-party Involvement
in Settlements? 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 221, (1999). This is beyond the scope of this
paper.
297. See Peterson v. Thyden, No. CL 2009–5670, 2009 WL 1026043 (Va. Cir. Ct.
April 16, 2009); see also Steve Szkotak, Jury Finds Virginia Tech Liable in Campus
Shooting, THE CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (March 14, 2012), http://www.csmonitor.
com/USA/Latest-News-Wires/2012/0314/Jury-finds-Virginia-Tech-liable-in-campusshooting.
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After trial, the jury awarded each of the two plaintiffs $4,000,000.298
The case made its way up to the Supreme Court of Virginia, where
the lower court’s findings were reversed. The Court held that “the
facts in this case do not give rise to a duty for the Commonwealth to
warn students of the potential for third party criminal acts.”299 In
less than three years since that decision was published, courts in
Virginia utilized its precedent in deciding six cases in that state.300
More recently, in 2012, high school student T.J. Lane entered the
Chardon High School cafeteria in Ohio with a .22 caliber semiautomatic handgun and shot six students.301 Relatives of some of the
students who were killed sued, inter alia, the school board, the
school district, and several school employees, alleging, inter alia,
wrongful death and recklessness.302 The defendants moved for
judgment on the pleadings, alleging that they were immune because
they were acting in their official capacity as employees of a political
subdivision.303 The trial court disagreed, denying the defendants’
motion, and the Court of Appeals of Ohio affirmed the trial court’s
ruling.304 While that precedent has to date not been utilized (and
hopefully will never need to be), the litigation in that case let to a
better understanding of the responsibility of certain parties in Ohio
regarding school safety.305 The importance of the precedential value
of these cases cannot be overstated as they contribute to our
collective jurisprudence regarding school shootings and gun safety.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
Given that the Supreme Court has tacitly approved the use of
pseudonymous plaintiffs,306 I recommend that the Court exercise its
supervisory authority over the federal courts307 and promulgate

298. Peterson v. Thyden, No. CL09–5525, 2012 WL 2022237 (Va. Cir. Ct. Mar.
14, 2012); see also Szkotak, supra note 271.
299. Commonwealth v. Peterson, 749 S.E.2d 307, 311 (Va. 2013).
300. A search on Westlaw’s Keycite feature yielded six Virginia cases citing to
Peterson (Sept. 7, 2017).
301. See Crime Sider Staff, T.J. Lane, Chardon High School Shooting Suspect,
Pleads Guilty to Aggravated Murder Charges, CBS NEWS (Feb. 26, 2013),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/tj-lane-chardon-high-school-shooting-suspect-pleadsguilty-to-aggravated-murder-charges/.
302. Parmertor v. Chardon Local Schs., 47 N.E.3d 942, 945 (Ct. App. Ohio 2016).
303. Id. at 946.
304. Id. at 952–54.
305. Id.
306. See supra Part II.B.1.
307. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 437 (2000).
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rules of civil procedure establishing standards and procedures for
rightsholders seeking to proceed pseudonymously. While the
specifics of these procedures are beyond the scope of this paper, I
advance that it is imperative that the potential for public shaming
as a result of bringing a lawsuit—and the deterrent effect that such
shaming can have—be a central consideration when evaluating
whether to permit a rightsholder to litigate pseudonymously.308
Under my proposal, the rightsholder would have to demonstrate that
(i) circumstances exist such that proceeding under a pseudonym is
necessary to avoid the “likelihood of susceptibility to public shaming”
as a result of bringing the lawsuit; and (ii) the rightsholder would be
reasonably deterred from proceeding, out of concern for the public
shaming. The burden would then shift to the defendant to show how
permitting the rightsholder to proceed under a pseudonym would be
prejudicial to the defense of the case. The plaintiff’s anonymity
would extend only to court filings and any other documents that
would be released to the public.309 In other words, the defendant
would have the same information about the plaintiff had the
plaintiff filed the case under her own name. The public would also be
welcome to protest the plaintiff’s anonymity, demonstrating why the
plaintiff’s specific identity would be necessary for a public
understanding of the legal issues involved in the case.
The court would be free to modify this ruling at any point in the
proceeding should the circumstances change. The defendant would
be permitted to file motions stating objections to the plaintiff’s use of
a pseudonym as the case progresses, and the court could even review
the issue sua sponte. However, once the rightsholder demonstrated a
likelihood of public shaming as a result of bringing the action—
shaming that would reasonably deter her from going forward—the
criteria for re-evaluation would be limited to (i) whether the public’s
lack of knowledge of the plaintiff’s identity impairs the defendant’s
ability to defend the case, or (ii) whether the public’s lack of
knowledge of the plaintiff’s identity impairs the public’s ability to
understand the legal issues in the case. If it is shown that there is no
longer a threat to the plaintiff of being publicly shamed, or any such
threat should not reasonably deter the plaintiff from proceeding,
then anonymity would no longer be required. Protections against the

308. I urge the Judicial Conference to propose uniform rules for the Supreme
Court to adopt regarding standards for proceeding pseudonymously. The particulars,
however, are beyond the scope of this paper.
309. Documents that could become public could be redacted to remove reference
to the specific identity of the plaintiff without losing the nature of their content.
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defendant’s release of the plaintiff’s identity should be contained in a
court order against disclosure. This order would in essence be no
different than the sorts of protective orders that courts routinely
issue during the course of litigation.
A proposed order could be fashioned as follows:
ORDER
Upon consideration of plaintiff’s Motion for Permission to
Proceed in Pseudonym and for Protective Order, and defendant’s
response thereto, it is hereby ORDERED that said Motion is
GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:
1. Plaintiff is allowed to proceed in pseudonym and the docket
shall continue to reflect plaintiff’s name as Jane Doe.
2. Plaintiff will be referred to as Jane Doe in all depositions,
pleadings and other documents related to this litigation, and the
plaintiff shall be allowed to endorse documents related to this
litigation using the pseudonym, Jane Doe.
3. The identity of Jane Doe and her address shall be available
to the attorneys of record and in-house counsel for the defendants,
who shall not disclose or permit disclosure thereof, except to the
following persons:
a) Their law partners, associates and persons employed in
the law offices of such attorneys, and other in-house counsel;
b) The employees of defendant who have knowledge of the
facts alleged in the Amended Complaint;
c) Bona fide outside experts and their employees, not on the
staff of any party, consulted by such attorneys in the
prosecution or defense of the claims herein;
d) A person whose deposition is to be taken in this action,
but only to the extent necessary for the deposition; and
e) Any person who potentially possesses information that is
relevant to plaintiff’s claims or defendant’s defense.
4. Each person to whom the identity of Jane Doe is to be
disclosed pursuant to this Order, shall agree in advance:
a) That he or she will not disclose the identity of Jane Doe
to any person not entitled to know her identity under this
Order; and
b) That he or she will not use the identity of Jane Doe
except in connection with the prosecution or defense of the
claims herein.
5. In the event defendant believes it is necessary in the defense
of the claims herein for it to disclose the identity of Jane Doe to
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persons other than those specified in this Order, defendant shall
communicate with plaintiff’s counsel and if agreement cannot be
reached in writing, the matter shall be determined by the Court.
6. Attendance at any part of any deposition of which the
identity of Jane Doe is disclosed shall be limited to those to whom
disclosure of such information can be made pursuant to this Order,
and only after they have complied with the terms of this Order.
7. In all proceedings held before this Court, including trial, all
counsel, witnesses and court personnel present shall refer to plaintiff
by her pseudonym, Jane Doe.
8. In all proceedings held before this Court, including trial,
plaintiff’s photograph shall not be taken by members of the media
and plaintiff’s picture shall not be drawn by the courtroom artists.
9. The terms of this Order shall remain in effect until further
Order of this Court.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.310
Using the Jessica Ahlquist case311 as an example, the process
would work as follows:
Ahlquist would draft and file her complaint against the school
district, keeping all of the original facts but substituting “Jane Doe”
for her name as the plaintiff. She would then move the court for
permission to proceed under the pseudonym. Ahlquist would have to
demonstrate that she reasonably would be deterred from going
forward with her lawsuit if the court were to deny her motion. In so
doing she could point to previous examples of instances where
atheists bringing actions under the Equal Protection Clause were
publicly shamed. Ahlquist could emphasize any noteworthy
vulnerabilities particular to her—her age, for example.
In order to successfully object to Ahlquist’s use of a pseudonym,
the defendant would be required to explain why its defense would be
jeopardized by permitting Ahlquist to be anonymous. First, the court
would determine whether Ahlquist’s allegation that she would be
deterred from proceeding if denied the ability to do so anonymously
was reasonable. Next, the court would establish if the defendant
would be unable to mount a complete defense to Ahlquist’s
allegations if she were permitted to proceed anonymously (but
known to the defendant). Assuming that the court determined that
Ahlquist could go forward using the pseudonym, the case would

310.
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311.

See, e.g., Doe v. Provident Life & Acc. Ins., 176 F.R.D. 464, 470–71 (E.D. Pa.
See discussion infra Part I.C.
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remain docketed with the plaintiff’s name as “Jane Doe.” The public
would have full access to “Jane Doe’s” complaint. It would be free to
petition the court for release of Jane Doe’s true name. In order to be
successful, the public would need to convince the court that there
was something about the plaintiff’s specific identity that was
necessary for an understanding and assessment of the legal issues
involved in the case. If the case remained docketed as “Jane Doe,”
the public would still be free to voice its criticism of the plaintiff’s
Equal Protection claim. However, rather than attack Ahlquist
personally—as happened in her case—the public would express its
disdain for her position as a plaintiff.
Using plaintiff pseudonymity to combat public shaming is not
without its flaws. From the parties’ perspective, proceeding
anonymously could inadvertently create a “Streisand effect,”
drawing unwanted attention to the case. There would also be added
expenses to the plaintiff related to the motion seeking pseudonymity.
From the courts’ perspective, the process of assessing a request for
plaintiff anonymity would increase the courts’ workload and could
create further inefficiencies in the already overburdened judicial
system. For example, it could be difficult for a court to determine
what constitutes a reasonable fear of being publicly shamed that
would deter a rightsholder from coming forward. And even after
making such a determination, fashioning a suitable protective order
in a particular case might be exceptionally challenging. Many cases
dealing with anonymous plaintiffs are not appealed, so there likely
will not be much precedent to offer guidance. And, while it might be
simple to redact the plaintiff’s name from relevant documents,
redacting identifying information contained therein could be
anything but straightforward. Indeed, the process simply might not
work. For example, in the case of Prestigious Pets,312 it would be
difficult to shield the plaintiff’s identity when the Yelp posting is
available for public view.
From the perspective of the public, there is a risk that permitting
certain plaintiffs to proceed anonymously will erode confidence in
the judicial system. Society might be wary of plaintiffs who seek to
conceal their identity, believing that their anonymity influenced the
decision.313 Furthermore, there could be situations where society
would benefit from public shaming as a deterrent to litigation. The
Prestigious Pets314 case might be an example where it would be
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See discussion supra Part IC.
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favorable to deter the company’s speech-stifling lawsuit and spare
the Yelp reviewer the expsense of defending herself in costly
litigation.
Nonetheless, in the right circumstances, plaintiff pseudonymity
could neutralize the dangers of public shaming, while maintaining
society’s access to the judicial process and ability to express distain
for disfavorable lawsuits.
CONCLUSION
Social media and the internet ensure that widespread public
shaming is here to stay. While several scholars have written about
various remedies for those who have been harmed by such
shaming,315 my focus is on preventing the shaming before it occurs.
Specifically, my concern is with rightsholders whose vulnerability to
shaming impacts their ability to seek justice. When a lawsuit is
likely to be met with public shaming that reasonably would deter a
rightsholder from proceeding, I propose that that rightsholder be
permitted to litigate pseudonymously. Under the right
circumstances, plaintiff pseudonymity could neutralize the dangers
of public shaming, while maintaining society’s ability to access the
judicial process, enable individual rightsholders to obtain justice,
and maintain the law’s effectiveness in promoting desired social
policy.
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28wA; Jon Ronson, When online shaming spirals out of control, TED TALKS (July
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